“In the Pre-Predicamenta, Aristotle (384-322 BC) discusses a number of semantic relations (1a1–16), gives a division of beings (τἃ ὄντα), into four kinds.
By focusing on Aristotle’s illustrations, most scholars conclude that beings that are said-of others are universals, while those that are not said-of others are particulars. Beings that are present-in others are accidental, while those that are not present-in others are non-accidental. Now, non-accidental beings that are universals are most naturally described as essential, while non-accidental beings that are particulars are best described simply as non-accidental.”
The OntoUML diagram below presents the main entities of Aristotle’s four-fold division:
| Class | Description | Relations |
|---|---|---|
| Being | Being (τὰ ὄντα) can be: particulars: EssentialParticular-PrimarySubstance; AccidentalParticular-NonSubstantialParticular and universals: EssentialUniversal-SecondarySubstance; AccidentalUniversal | generalizes EssentialParticular-PrimarySubstance; AccidentalParticular-NonSubstantialParticular; EssentialUniversal-SecondarySubstance; AccidentalUniversal |
| EssentialUniversal -SecondarySubstance | “in addition to primary substances, which are particulars, there are secondary substances, which are [essential] universals. His example of such an entity is man, which, […] is a universal in the category of substance… we should interpret secondary substances as essential characteristics of primary substances” Example: Man | essential characteristic, component of at least one EssentialParticular -PrimarySubstance |
| EssentialParticular -PrimarySubstance | “The pride of place in this classificatory scheme, according to Aristotle, goes to those entities that are neither said-of nor present-in anything. Such entities, Aristotle says, are primary substances [or essential particulars…] His favorite examples are an individual man and a horse […] So, it is natural to interpret him as thinking that among primary substances are concrete particulars that are members of natural kinds.” Example: Socrates | is in material relation with at least one AccidentalUniversal |
| AccidentalParticular -NonSubstantialParticular | “a non-substantial [accidental] particular is a dependent entity, individuated only by reference to primary substance that it is present in. Hence, Socrates’ whiteness cannot exist without Socrates.” Example: Socrates’s whiteness | role of AccidentalUniversal |
| AccidentalUniversal | “being is both said-of and present-in a primary substance if it is an accidental universal… The universal whiteness is said-of many primary substances but is only accidental to them.” Example: whiteness, as color |
Related posts in theory of Universals: [1.2.2], [1.3.1], [1.3.2], [2.5], [2.7.3], [4.3.1], [4.3.2], [4.4.1], [4.5.2], [4.9.8], [4.11], [4.15.6], [4.18.8]
The source of all citations and more about the topic in: Studtmann, Paul, “Aristotle’s Categories“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
First published: 07/02/2019
Updated: 3/1/2020 Diagram modified to OntoUML standard
Updated: 7/12/2021
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