John Duns Scotus (the “Subtle Doctor,” 1265/66–1308 AD), in “Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis”, “Lectura” and “Ordinatio” writes about modal theory, contingency of the present, and free will. His main ideas are:
He thinks, that modality (necessity and contingency) is not essentially connected to time.
The past is necessary, but contrary to the Aristotelian view (see [1.3.19]), the present is contingent, as the future is.
The present is contingent because, at a given time, we can have alternative open possibilities (potencies), all with the capacity to realize (actualize) in the instant of the present moment. In these cases, the present event is not necessarry because all the alternative possibilities could realize in the present instant. In these cases we don’t have an ordering in time of the potency and the actualized potency, but an ordering of instants of nature.
As a self-mover, the free will of the intelligent creature can pick one (or more) of the alternative possibilities and realize it in the present instant.
The following OntoUML diagram presents Duns Scotus’s theory of contingency of the present and free will.
“In his Physics Aristotle defines time as the measure of change (kinesis) with respect to prior and posterior and defines change as the actualization of a potentiality as such.”
Scotus accepts the necessity of the past. “the past and future met in the present instant”
phase of Time
“He denies the same necessity to the present. […] The present instant can, at a minimum, be regarded as a pair of instants of nature ordered as before and after in nature. […] Scotus thinks that it is because of this ordering of nature within the present instant of time that we can speak of the present as being only contingently the way it is. It is as if the past and future met in the present instant with the prior instant of nature belonging to the past (as its endpoint) and the posterior one to the future (as its beginning).”
phase of Time
“the past and future met in the present instant”
phase of Time
Potency in the Aristotelian sense (see [1.3.4]). Example: “Consider a rational creature – an angel, for example – that exists only for an instant during which it is, let us suppose, loving God. The question posed is whether it could be loving God freely. The argument that the angel could not be loving God freely is that for it to do so it has to have a power [potency] to do otherwise, say, to hate God.”
prior to ActualizedPotency; is in Present
Not-actualized potency, in the Aristotelian sense (see [1.3.4]) : a potency, which has not been realized. Example: The angel does not hate God.
role of Potency
Actualized potency, in the Aristotelian sense (see [1.3.4]) : a potency, which has been realized. Example: The angel loves God.
role of Potency; is in Present
“not all causal relations (largely understood) involve succession in time. For Scotus the productive relations within the Trinity serve as obvious cases in which no temporal succession is involved, and the creation of the world (and with it motion and so time) is another. Even in natural philosophy the picture of light’s being propagated instantaneously through a diaphanous medium by the sun, a hypothesis certainly compatible with the empirical data available to Scotus, served as a case of a causal process in which the effect and the cause were coincident in time and in which, despite the temporal coincidence, there is a clear sense in which emission of light by the sun is prior to its reception on the earth. Now if one holds, as Scotus did, that in the relevant sense a power [potency] must be prior to its actualization (see In Metaph. 9, q. 14, for example) and one accepts the Propositio Famosa, one could generalize these examples to produce a partial ordering of instants of nature.A is naturally prior to B if and only if mention of A is required in giving an explanation of B. We can now give a sufficient condition for the distinctness of two instants of nature n1 and n2. […]” Example: “In the context of the angel existing only for a single temporal instant, Scotus treats an instant of time as divisible into a sequence of instants of nature. […] The prior is that in which the angel has both the power [potency] to love God and the power to hate God, and the posterior is that in which the angel has actualized the power [potency] to love God. These are prior and posterior in nature because the power [potency] to love God is naturally prior to its actualization. Since ‘in’ the instant of time there is an instant of nature (namely the prior of the two) at which the angel has the power to hate God, we can say that the angel has the power [potency] to hate God at that instant of time (and could, relative to that ‘prior’ instant of nature, actualize it at the posterior instant of nature), and thus the angel is now free. [his will is free]”
relates Potency with ActualizedPotency
Creature’s will “is the exercise of a rational power – that is, a power for opposites – that includes the ‘nonevident’ power for the contrary at time t of whatever it is actually choosing at time t.” Example: “the angel could not be loving God freely is that for it to do so it has to have a power [power] to do otherwise, say, to hate God.”
recognizes Potency; decides for ActualizedPotency; is in Present
Decision of the Creature’sWill about the Potency to actualize.
Relates Creature’sWill with ActualizedPotency
A creature’s (e.g. a human or an angel) will is a self mover, because it has “a power for opposites – that includes the ‘nonevident’ power for the contrary at time t of whatever it is actually choosing at time t.” Example: The angel could love or hate God.
All citations from: Normore, Calvin G., “Duns Scotus’s Modal Theory”, The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus, Cambridge University Press 2003, ed. Thomas Williams
Williams, Thomas, “John Duns Scotus“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
St Thomas Aquinas (“Doctor Angelicus”, 1225 – 1274 AD) in his works On Being and Essence and The Principles of Nature writes about substance as a primary metaphysical category.
His model is an evolved version of Aristotelian hylomorphism (see [1.3.5], and for humans [1.3.7]), where substances are enduring primary existents composed of prime matter and substantial form.
The soul is the form of the living human body.
Incidental (or accidental) changes modify the substance’s incidental forms (or properties) like quality, quantity, place, while substantial change modifies its existence.
The following OntoUML diagram presents Aquinas’s model of substance and change:
According to Aquinas substances are what are primarily said to exist. “[…] enduring things like men and trees and horses and the like have also come into being and are destined some day to cease to be. Such things are called substances.“
“The subject of a surface or incidental change is a substance [its incidental form]. The subject of a substantial change cannot be a substance; if it were, the result would be a modification of that substance, that is, an incidental change. But we are trying to understand how a substance itself comes into being as the result of a change. There must be a matter or subject but it cannot be matter in the sense of a substance. In order to signal this, we can call the matter prime matter, first matter. But it is important to recognize that this prime matter is not a substance, and does not exist apart from any particular substance. It is always the matter of some substance that exists.”
“The form in a substantial change must be that which makes the substance to be what it is. Call it substantial form.”
characterizes Substance; inherits from Form
Incidental form (or accidental form) can be: “like size or location or temperature”
characterizes Substance; inherits from Form
The “elements of the change get the names that stick from another example, whittling wood. The term for wood in Greek is hyle and the term for shape, the external contours of a thing, is morphe. In English, form, a synonym of shape, is used to express the characteristic that the subject acquires as the result of the change, e.g. musical.”
A living human body
subkind of Substance
“When the discussion moves on from what may be said of all physical objects as such to an inquiry into living physical things, the analyses build upon those already completed. Thus, “soul”will be defined as the form of living [human] bodies. […] Thomas merely concludes from this fact that the soul is a ‘particular thing’ and thus a subsistent after the death of the body. He argues that what belongs to the notion of ‘this particular thing’ is only that it be a subsistent, and not that it be a substance complete in a nature. A subsistent is something with an operation of its own, existing either on its own or in another as an integral part, but not in the way either accidental or material forms exist in another. Existing on its own is not distinctive of substances alone. A chair is a particular thing, and thus a subsistent. But on Aquinas’ account it is not a substance; it is rather an accidental unity of other subsistents which may or may not be substances. A hand has an operation distinctive of it as an integral part of a living body, an operation different from the operation of the stomach; it is a particular thing and also a subsistent. (Summa Theologiae Ia.75.2 ad1; also Quaestiones Disputate de Anima 2.) And yet being an integral and functional part of a substance, it does not have the complete nature of a substance.”
inherits from SubstantialForm; characterizes LivingHumanBody
Change is can be a change of one substance into another substance, or a modification of an already existing substance. “Aristotle had to begin with a particular example of change, one so obvious that we would not be distracted by any difficulties in accepting it as such. ‘A man becomes musical.’ Someone acquires a skill he did not previously have. Thomas pores over the analysis Aristotle provides of this instance of change and its product. The change may be expressed in three ways:  A man becomes musical.  What is not-musical becomes musical.  A not-musical man becomes musical. These are three different expressions of the same change and they all exhibit the form A becomes B. But change can also be expressed as From A, B comes to be. Could 1, 2 and 3 be restated in that second form? To say ‘From the not-musical the musical comes to be’ and ‘From a not-musical man the musical comes to be’ seem acceptable alternatives, but ‘From a man musical comes to be’ would give us pause. Why? Unlike ‘A becomes B’ the form ‘From A, B comes to be’ suggests that in order for B to emerge, A must cease to be. This grounds the distinction between the grammatical subject of the sentence expressing a change and the subject of the change. The definition of the subject of the change is ‘that to which the change is attributed and which survives the change.’ The grammatical subjects of 2 and 3 do not express the subject of the change. Only in 1 is the grammatical subject expressive of the subject of the change. This makes clear that the different expressions of the change involve two things other than the subject of the change, namely, the characteristics of the subject before (not-musical) and after (musical) the change. These elements of the change get the names that stick from another example, whittling wood. The term for wood in Greek is hyle and the term for shape, the external contours of a thing, is morphe. In English, form, a synonym of shape, is used to express the characteristic that the subject acquires as the result of the change, e.g. musical. The characterization of the subject prior to the change as not having the form is called privation. Using this language as canonical, Aristotle speaks of the subject of the change as its hyle or matter, the character it gains as its morphe or form, and its prior lack of the form as its privation. Any change will involve these three elements: matter, form and privation. The product of a change involves two things: matter and form.”
“The analysis of change and the product of change begins with surface [incidental] changes [or accidental changes]. Some enduring thing changes place or quality or quantity. […] As the analysis of incidental change makes clear, the substance previously existed without the form it acquires in the change and it could lose it and still be itself.”
inherits from Change; changes IncidentalForm
“In a substantial change, the substance itself simply comes to be, or ceases to be.”
inherits from Change; changes existence of SubstantialForm
All citations from: McInerny, Ralph and John O’Callaghan, “Saint Thomas Aquinas”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)