Peter Abelard (1079?-1142 AD), in his work Logica Ingredientibus, concluded that the uttered words and the related concepts are the only real universals. According to his nominalist (or irrealist) theory, the individual’s status is the common cause by which we can create a common concept and give a common name to all individuals belonging to the same kind.
Here are Abelard’s responses to Porphyry’s questions (see [2.5]):
Universals according to Abelard
(a) whether genera and species are real or are situated in bare thoughts alone
are situated in thoughts (as concepts and words)
(b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals
they are not real things
(c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them
they are not real things
Abelard’s model of universals is presented in the following OntoUML diagram:
“Words here = ‘voces,’ which I said earlier might best be translated ‘utterances’. Only they are predicated of many. […] .” E.g. ‘man’ – which names and is imposed on Plato, Soctates and Justin Bieber.
names, imposed on Individual; signifies establishes understanding of Concept
“but for Abelard, universals were not just voces but also sermones—significant voces [..] What are we made to think of when we hear the word ‘man’? In short, what is the link-up between our universal terms, our concepts,and the external world? How are we going to save Abelard’s nominalism from the epistemological skepticism it threatens to yield? This is the meat of Abelard’s theory. Well, here is where considerations about equivocation do apply. If a universal term is going to be univocal, it must establish in us a single understanding, a single concept. (‘Understanding’ in these contexts does not mean the faculty of understanding, but either the act of understanding or else the object of such an act.) That concept has to be a general concept. But what is it a concept of? Not of a general or universal thing, since there aren’t any, as Abelard has argued at length. Neither does the universal term make us think of individual things, for the reasons we’ve already seen, reasons the objection states and Abelard apparently accepts.”
in material relation with Individual
“There must, therefore, Abelard says […], be some common cause or reason why the universal term [concept] is “imposed on” the several individuals it names (“imposition” is the assigning of names to things), and so names the several individuals it does, and which links the name to the general concept we have when we hear the term. This ‘common cause’ is going to be the linkage between our concepts and the world that saves the objectivity of our knowledge. So it’s going to be pretty important. It common cause (?) imposed on, names concept ‘man’ establishes an understanding is whatever it is that answers the question, ‘What is it that links the general concept generated by a universal term with the individual things the term is truly predicable of? Well, how does it work? We need to look at both sides of the question: (a) at this mysterious “common cause,” and also at (b) the ‘common concept’ that it grounds […]. Ad (a): We have seen that Abelard criticized William of Champeaux’s second theory for saying that, while Socrates and Plato had two distinct essences, nevertheless they agreed — ‘indifferently,’ to be sure, but ‘agreeing’ nonetheless — in man or in humanity. Abelard thought this was just a verbal smoke screen. He says instead that Socrates and Plato agree, or are alike in being a man, or in that they are men, or in being man […]. So what? What is the big difference here? Well, there is a big difference. A man is a thing — a res. And there is no thing in which Socrates and Plato agree, no thing they can share, as Abelard has already argued at length. Nevertheless, they must somehow agree, there must be some community between them, or else there would be no objective basis for our calling them both ‘men,’ and we would be left with subjectivity and skepticism — and Roscelin’s doctrine. The common predication of the word ‘man’ of both of them must be tied to reality somehow. Well, Abelard bites the bullet. Since Socrates and Plato cannot ‘agree in’ or share any common thing, and since they must nevertheless have some community, it follows that they must agree in or share some non-thing, something that is not a thing — not a res. They do not agree in man, he says […], but they do agree in being a man (= hominem esse), otherwise translated as ‘to be a man.’ Being a man, therefore, is not a thing. This doesn’t mean that being a man is ‘nothing,’ that it isn’t really out there. It is really out there. It has to be, since there is an important epistemological job for it to do. But it is not a thing — not a res. Instead, it is what Abelard calls a ‘status’ (fourth declension, so that the plural is ‘stat¨s’ — spelled the same, but with a long ‘¨’). This word ‘status’ as a technical expression is not unique to Abelard in the twelfth century. Other people used the word too. For example, Walter of Mortagne used it. But we shouldn’t assume immediately that the word always means the same thing for all these people. And in fact, in many cases it may not be clear just what a given author means by it. In any case, let’s look at how Abelard is using it here.”
is the common cause for the relation between Individual and Concept
In the UML Activity Diagram below, I propose a reconstruction of the scientific “business” process based on Ibn Sina’s (Avicenna, 980-1037 AD) ideas about scientific inquiry elaborated in his works Kitābal-Burhân, Najâh. Here are some highlights of his ideas:
Sense perception with the involvement of the 5 external and internal senses (see [3.3.3]) is the starting point of the scientific process.
Abstraction, Induction and Methodic Experience are the activities to acquire First Principles. Syllogisms (see [3.3.5]) and actualization of the Intellect with Forms provided by First Intellect (see [3.3.3], [3.3.4]) both have their roles in these activities.
After First Principles are available, new knowledge can be reached with deduction, using syllogisms (see [3.3.5]).
Obtain perceptibles of an object with Sense Perception
“the universal premises of demonstration and their principles are obtained only through sensory perception…” (McGinnis (2008), cites Avicenna)
“by acquiring the phantasmata (خيالات) of the singular terms through the intermediacy of [sensory perception] in order that the intellectual faculty freely acts on them in such a way that it leads to acquiring the universals as singular terms and combining them into a well-formed statement… [T]he essences perceptible in existence are not in themselves intelligible, but perceptible; however, the intellect makes them so as to be intelligible, because it abstracts their true nature (حقيقتها) from the concomitants of matter… Thus [the speculative intellect] receives these accidents, but then it extracts them, as if it is peeling away these accidents and setting them to one side, until it arrives at the account in which are common and in which there is no variation and so acquires knowledge of them and conceptualizes them. The first thing that [the intellect] inquires into is the confused mixture in the phantasm; for it finds accidental and essential features, and among the accidents those which are necessary and those which are not. It then isolates one account after another of the numerous ones mixed together in the phantasm, following them along to the essence. (McGinnis (2008), cites Avicenna) “this is not Avicenna’s whole story concerning abstraction and acquiring first principles; for as he says later, acquisition of the first principles also involves “a conjunction of the intellect with a light emanated upon the soul and nature from the agent that is called the ‘Active Intellect’” (McGinnis (2008)).
Avicenna accepts Aristotle’s view on Induction (see [1.3.8]) however, criticizes it: “Induction has two elements: one involves the sensible content of induction and the other the rational structure of induction, namely, the syllogism associated with induction. If induction is to provide one with the necessary and certain first principles of a science, then the necessity and certainty of the conclusion of an inductive syllogism must be due either to induction’s sensory element or its rational element or some combination of both. On the one hand, the purported necessity and certainty of induction cannot be known solely through induction’s sensory element; for in good empirical fashion Avicenna recognizes that necessity and certainty are not direct objects of sensation. On the other hand, if the necessity and certainty are due to induction’s rational component, then the syllogism associated with induction should not be question begging. Yet, complains Avicenna, in the scientifically interesting cases one of the premises of an induction will be better known than its conclusion, and so the induction is neither informative nor capable of making clear a first principle of a science.” (McGinnis (2008)).
“Ibn Sînâ’s theory of experimentation is by no means modern, it does move one closer to a modern scientific approach; for it emphasizes both the need to set out carefully the conditions under which experimentation or examination have taken place, as well as the tentativeness of scientific discoveries in the face of new observations… experimentation involves in part seeking falsifying cases…the exceptions [falsifying cases] would be extremely rare, perhaps observed only once or twice. These rare exceptions might indicate that there is not a causal relation, but they might also indicate that the causal circumstances were more complex than initially supposed… Experimentation, with its accompanying syllogism, then, occasions certainty… although experimentation cannot provide “absolute” principles, the natural scientist can use experimentation to discover “conditional,” universal principles, which can function as first principles in a science.” (McGinnis (2003)).
Check certainty condition (true/ real, necessary)
“Avicenna’s ‘certainty condition’ (يقين),… includes both being true or real (الحقّ) and necessary (الضروري)” (McGinnis (2008)).
First Priciple Acquired
If certainty condition is fulfilled.
“A demonstration according to Avicenna is ‘a syllogism constituting certainty’. In other words, it is a deduction beginning with premises that are certain or necessary that concludes that not only such and such is the case, but that such and such cannot not be the case. Thus, demonstrative knowledge involves possessing a syllogism that makes clear the necessity or inevitableness obtaining between the subject and predicate terms of its conclusion. In addition, Avicenna divides demonstrative knowledge itself into two categories depending upon the type of demonstration employed. Thus there is the demonstration propter quid, or demonstration giving ‘the reason why’ ( برهان لِمَ ) and the demonstration quia, or demonstration giving ‘the fact that’ (برهان لأن ).” (McGinnis (2008)).
McGinnis, Jon, “Avicenna’s Naturalized Epistemology and Scientific Method”, chapter from: The Unity of Science in the Arabic Tradition: Science, Logic, Epistemology and their Interactions, springer, 2008
McGinnis, Jon, “Scientific Methodologies in Medieval Islam”, Journal of the History of Philosophy. 41. 307-327. 10.1353/hph.2003.0033., 2003