- The passive intellect can potentially be anything by receiving that thing’s intelligible form.
- The active intellect takes on the immaterial intelligible form through thinking.
The following OntoUML diagram shows Aristotle’s model of passive and active intellect:
|Intellect||In De Anima III.4-5. “Aristotle gives an account of thinking (or intellect [mind]—noêsis) that is modeled on his account of perception in Book II. Just as in perception, ‘that which perceives’ (to aisthêtikon) takes on sensible form (without matter), so in thinking ‘that which thinks’ (to noêtikon) takes on intelligible form (without matter). Similarly, just as in perception, the perceiver has the quality of the object potentially, but not actually, so, too, in understanding, the intellect is potentially (although not actually) each of its objects. […] |
‘intellect understands all things’ (nous panta noei, 429a19). Not only can you think about the objects of perception (colors, odors, sounds, the son of Diares, etc.), but you can think about things that can’t be perceived at all (numbers, virtues, etc.), either intrinsically or coincidentally. You can think about anything. This universality of the objects of thought has several important consequences.
Intellect is ‘unmixed’
The first is that the intellect “must be unmixed,” i.e., must be pure potential (since it can think about anything, it must be only potentially that thing). So it has no nature of its own—if it did, it would be unable to think about that nature.
Intellect is separable, perception is bodily
‘It is unreasonable for intellect to be mixed with the body, since it would then acquire some quality (for instance, hot or cold) or even, like the perceiving part, have some organ, whereas in fact it has none. (42925-27)’
Since intellect does not have a bodily organ, it is separable from the body:
‘… intellect is separable, whereas the perceiving part requires a body. (429b5)'”
|PassiveIntellect||“Aristotle never actually uses the phrase nous pathêtikos (passive intellect), but the concept is clearly present in his account. We can reconstruct his argument as follows. It begins with the total passivity of an intellect that can ‘become all things.’|
The passive intellect is potentially each of its objects, but not actually any of them. (429a16)
The passive intellect can think anything. (429a18)
Hence, the passive intellect is actually nothing until it thinks. (429a23)”
|ActiveIntellect||“The Active Intellect […] is something other than the passive intellect […] is the efficient cause of its thinking (i.e., of its taking on intelligible form). […] |
Nous poiêtikos [active intellect] is thus not ‘mind’ but an aspect of the mind; an aspect of a person’s mental capacities. The characteristics that have led some to identify nous poiêtikos with God or with something divine are these. It is, Aristotle says:
‘separate, impassive, ever-active, immortal, eternal’
But these attributes can be construed more antiseptically. They are mostly features of the immateriality of nous poiêtikos. Being separate does not imply a possible pre- or post-embodiment existence: rather, it implies nothing more than irreducibility to anything material.”
|in material relation with IntelligibleForm|
|IntelligibleForm||The active intellect, that which thinks’ (to noêtikon) takes on the immaterial intelligible form linked to the object of thought (noêton).|
|Thinking||Thinking: “the active intellect makes things thinkable by making them actually thought-about.”||relates IntelligibleForm with ActiveIntellect|
- The source of all citations: Cohen, S. Marc Cohen, “Aristotle on Thinking (Noêsis)”, notes Washington University, 2008
- Shields, Christopher, “Aristotle’s Psychology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
First published: 1/7/2021