Gilbert of Poitiers (Gilbert de la Porrée, 1085?–1154 AD) in different commentaries to Boethius’s De Trinitate, De Hebdomadibus, and Contra Eutychen et Nestorium proposes an anti-realist theory of universals, according to which:
- universals (like genus and species) are sets (collectiones)
- these sets are based on the resemblance of some essential properties (subsistentiae) of individuals.
Here are Gilbert’s responses to Porphyry’s questions (see [2.5]):
| Porphyry’s questions | Universals according to Gilbert |
| (a) whether genera and species [universals] are real or are situated in bare thoughts alone | are situated in thoughts (as sets) |
| (b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporeals | they are not real things |
| (c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them | they are not real things |
Gilbert’s model of universals is pictured in the following OntoUML diagram:
| Class | Description | Relations |
| Genus | Genus is a collection of Species | |
| Species | Species is a collection of EssientialProperites (substancia), based on their resemblance (Conformitas) | is subcollection of Genus |
| Conformitas | “For Gilbert, a universal is a collection of properties on the basis of resemblance. His theory is based upon the notion of conformitas. There are many subsistentiae of a given kind, the number of which is the same as that of the subsistents of which they are the being (this thesis is summarized clearly by the author of the Compendium Logicae Porretanum in the formula ‘there are as many humanities as there are men’), and their natural conformity causes their generic or specific union. Gilbert notes that universals are ‘collected from particulars by the intellect.’ The intellect is able to abstract on the basis of conformitas, which is naturally given and may be observed through the manifest resemblance that exists between things in the sensible world. The universal is the union of subsistentiae in virtue of their conformity—union, but not unity.” | mediates between EssentialProperies; Species is abstracted (by the Intellect) form Conformitas |
| Essential Property | “An id quo —that is, an essential property—is also called subsistentia, a particular essential property or substantial form determining the being of just one individual. Each individual, or subsistens, is constituted of several subsistentiae. The interest and originality of Gilbert’s position lie in the fact that each of these subsistentiae is particular.” E.g. The animality of Felix, the cat. | component of Essence |
| Essence | “All these subsistentiae taken together constitute the essence of an individual, which Gilbert calls tota substantia.“ | component of TotalForm |
| TotalForm | “Gilbert offers a very interesting theoretical tool for the consideration of an individual seen over a whole lifetime. He probably pursues the doctrinal aim of ensuring personal identity across time and of avoiding that an individual undergoing qualitative or quantitative change becomes a different individual. Gilbert introduces the concept of forma tota [total form] to refer to the set of all the properties that might be true of a given subject, including also those that will never be actualized. The sum of the essential properties and accidents thus constitutes the forma tota of the individual; the sum of the characteristics of Socrates is called Socrateitas and the sum of those of Plato, Platonitas. According to Gilbert, the tota forma of an individual—for example, Plato’s Platonitas— includes all its subsistences (its substantia tota) but also its quantitative and qualitative accidents—not only those it possesses actually (actu), but also those it possessed in the past and those it will or could possess in future according to the potentiality of its own nature. Expressed as bundle, the forma tota could be understood as the most comprehensive possible bundle. This total form belongs to just one concrete being. The individuality of a concrete being or, in Gilbert’s words, its numerical diversity, is caused by the particularity of its essential properties and rendered manifest by the fact that it possesses its own total form. An anonymous Porretan treatise is explicit when it speaks of the case of the individual Peter. The form which is composed of all the various properties, both essential and accidental, which are in Peter, and which make Peter different from all the other men, is called petritas. This form is particular, and explains how Peter is a being discrete from all other men”. | characterizes Individual |
| Individual | “An id quod est is an independent individual, such as Peter, my cat Felix, or this apple. Gilbert uses an alternative terminology: an id quod est, an individual, is also called a subsistens, a subsisting entity. […] An individual is the sum, the collection of all its essential subsistentiae and particular accidental properties.” |
Related posts in theory of Universals: [1.2.2], [1.3.1], [1.3.2], [2.5], [2.7.3], [4.3.1], [4.3.2], [4.4.1], [4.4.1], [4.5.2], [4.9.8]
Sources
- All citations from: Erismann, Christophe, “Explaining Exact Resemblance: Gilbert of Poitiers’s Conformitas Theory Reconsidered”, Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Volume 2, Edited by ROBERT PASNAU,2014
- Adamson, Peter, “216. One of a Kind: Gilbert of Poitiers on Individuation“, History of Philosophy without any Gaps podcast
First published: 07/07/2020
Philosophy Models 