Bernardino Telesio (1509–1588) “With regard to psychology, Telesio took a materialist standpoint. According to his general rejection of the metaphysical (and therefore inappropriate) principles of matter and form, he rejected Aristotle’s definition of the soul as forma corporis, i.e. as form and entelechy of an organic body (Aristotle, De anima II,1). According to Telesio, the soul is a separate being, but not in the sense of the Platonists, who define it as an immortal essence acting as the governor and mover of the body during its embodied life. Telesio held the soul to be a specific part of the body, defining it as the spiritus coursing through the nervous system and having its main seat in the brain. The spiritus which overtakes the role of the anima of the philosophical tradition is produced by the white ‘semen’. Telesio calls it the spiritus e semine eductus” So,
Human is a subkind of thing
Spirit is a component of human
The brain is a component spirit
Sense perception depends on the brain, it can take the form of pleasure and pain.
The following OntoUML diagram shows Bernardino Telesio’s model psychology:
“Telesio’s vision of the genesis of nature is simple to the point of being archaic, yet at the same time astonishingly modern in the sense that he seems to have been one of the very first defenders of a theory of natural evolution without metaphysical or theological presuppositions. According to his De rerum natura, the onlythingswhich must be presupposed are passivematter and active force, the latter of which Telesio thought of as twofold, heat and cold.”
“And just as there is no metaphysical difference between living and non-living bodies, there also does not exist a qualitative difference between animals and humans—in both, it is the same spirit which coordinates the functions and operations of the different bodily parts.”
subkind of Thing
“With regard to psychology, Telesio took a materialist standpoint. According to his general rejection of the metaphysical (and therefore inappropriate) principles of matter and form, he rejected Aristotle’s definition of the soul as forma corporis, i.e. as form and entelechy of an organic body (Aristotle, De anima II,1). According to Telesio, the soul[ie spirit] is a separate being, but not in the sense of the Platonists, who define it as an immortal essence acting as the governor and mover of the body during its embodied life. Telesio held the soul to be a specific part of the body, defining it as the spiritus coursing through the nervous system and having its main seat in the brain. The spirits[spirit] which overtakes the role of the anima of the philosophical tradition is produced by the white ‘semen’. Telesio calls it the spiritus e semine eductus. “This [separate substance] will therefore be the spiritus, which took its origin from the semen, as we will explain elsewhere (and it is to be found in all things made from semen, namely those which are white and bloodless, with the exception of the bones and similar things); and only the spirit is what perceives in the animal, and moves sometimes with the whole body, sometimes with single parts thereof, and solely governs the whole animal. That is to say, it performs those actions which, according to the concurring opinion of all, are typical of the soul.” (Vol. II, p. 208).”
“Telesio combined the medical theory of spirit with a basically Stoic notion, that of the hegemonikon, according to which the spirit in the brain is responsible for all the states and operations traditionally ascribed to the tripartite soul: “the animal … is governed by one substance residing in the brain” (Quod animal universum ch. XXV; Var. lib. p. 254). Whereas in Quod animal universum he went on to explain the affects in terms of physiology, in De rerum natura he added a theory of sense perception and a theory of knowledge on physical grounds.”
Sense perception: ‘In his opinion, to speak of sense organs is inappropriate, as the so-called sense organs are nothing else than “parts of the body which are either more subtle or soft than others, or perforated and open. One should not believe in the slightest that they are made thus in order to offer some capacity or support of perceiving to the sensitive soul (which seems to be the duty of organs), but in order to provide an easy and open entry to the forces of external things and to those things themselves.” […] As the sense of touch provides the most narrow contact between outer object and sensing spirit, it assumes the role of the primary sense, which was traditionally identified with the sense of vision (DRN book VII, ch. IX, vol. III, p. 34.) The informatio theory being rejected, Telesio comes close to a neuronal explanation of sense perception, which is a mechanical process arising from the transfer of tactile impressions through the nerves to the brain.”
historicalDependence on Brain
“It is the spirit residing in the brain which experiences nervous dilatations and contractions, and which judges these sensations according to the basic scheme of pleasure and pain, giving out corresponding reactions like moving towards something or avoiding contact (DRN book VII ch. II–V). “
historicalRole of SensePerception
Boenke, Michaela, “Bernardino Telesio“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) The Prince analized power on novel, uncompromising ways. Here are some highlights of his model.
Humans are can be rulers or subjects.
A ruler is characterized by legitimacy, authority, and Virtù.
The state mediates power with the ruler; and the state on the other hand provides order.
Subject is in material relation with order.
Fortuna manifests in a lack of order.
The following OntoUML diagram shows the main structure of Machiavelli’s model:
A human person.
“For Machiavelli, power characteristically defines political activity, and hence it is necessary for any successful ruler to know how power is to be used.”
role of Human
“Machiavelli’s “state” remains a personal patrimony, a possession more in line with the medieval conception of dominium as the foundation of rule. (Dominium is a Latin term that may be translated with equal force as “private property” and as “political dominion”.) Thus, the “state” is literally owned by whichever prince happens to have control of it. Moreover, the character of governance is determined by the personal qualities and traits of the ruler—hence, Machiavelli’s emphasis on virtù as indispensable for the prince’s success. These aspects of the deployment of lo stato in The Prince mitigate against the “modernity” of his idea. Machiavelli is at best a transitional figure in the process by which the language of the state emerged in early modern Europe, as Mansfield concludes.”
mediates Power with Ruler
“For Machiavelli, there is no moral basis on which to judge the difference between legitimate and illegitimate uses of power. Rather, authority and power are essentially coequal: whoever has power has the right to command; but goodness does not ensure power and the good person has no more authority by virtue of being good. […] For Machiavelli, power characteristically defines political activity, and hence it is necessary for any successful ruler to know how power is to be used. Only by means of the proper application of power, Machiavelli believes, can individuals be brought to obey and will the ruler be able to maintain the state in safety and security. […] Thus, in direct opposition to a moralistic theory of politics, Machiavelli says that the only real concern of the political ruler is the acquisition and maintenance of power (although he talks less about power per se than about “maintaining the state”.) In this sense, Machiavelli presents a trenchant criticism of the concept of authority by arguing that the notion of legitimate rights of rulership adds nothing to the actual possession of power.”
The Discourses certainly draw upon the same reservoir of language and concepts that flowed into The Prince, but the former treatise leads us to draw conclusions quite different from—many scholars have said contradictory to—the latter. In particular, across the two works, Machiavelli consistently and clearly distinguishes between a minimal and a full conception of “political” or “civil” order, and thus constructs a hierarchy of ends within his general account of communal life. A minimal constitutional order is one in which subjects live securely (viveresicuro), ruled by a strong government which holds in check the aspirations of both nobility and people, but is in turn balanced by other legal and institutional mechanisms. In a fully constitutional regime, however, the goal of the political order is the freedom of the community (viverelibero), created by the active participation of, and contention between, the nobility and the people. As Quentin Skinner (2002, 189–212) has argued, liberty forms a value that anchors Machiavelli’s political theory and guides his evaluations of the worthiness of different types of regimes. Only in a republic, for which Machiavelli expresses a distinct preference, may this goal be attained.
relates with state
A minimal constitutional order is one in which subjects live securely (viveresicuro), ruled by a strong government [state] which holds in check the aspirations of both nobility and people, but is in turn balanced by other legal and institutional mechanisms.
subkind of Human
Machiavelli’s political theory, then, represents a concerted effort to exclude issues of authority and legitimacy from consideration in the discussion of political decision-making and political judgment. Nowhere does this come out more clearly than in his treatment of the relationship between law and force. Machiavelli acknowledges that good laws and good arms constitute the dual foundations of a well-ordered political system. But he immediately adds that since coercion creates legality, he will concentrate his attention on force. He says, “Since there cannot be good laws without good arms, I will not consider laws but speak of arms” (Prince CW 47). In other words, the legitimacy of law rests entirely upon the threat of coercive force; authority is impossible for Machiavelli as a right apart from the power to enforce it. Consequently, Machiavelli is led to conclude that fear is always preferable to affection in subjects, just as violence and deception are superior to legality in effectively controlling them. Machiavelli observes that one can say this in general of men: they are ungrateful, disloyal, insincere and deceitful, timid of danger and avid of profit…. Love is a bond of obligation which these miserable creatures break whenever it suits them to do so; but fear holds them fast by a dread of punishment that never passes. (Prince CW 62; translation revised)
“The term that best captures Machiavelli’s vision of the requirements of power politics is virtù. While the Italian word would normally be translated into English as “virtue”, and would ordinarily convey the conventional connotation of moral goodness, Machiavelli obviously means something very different when he refers to the virtù of the prince. In particular, Machiavelli employs the concept of virtù to refer to the range of personal qualities that the prince will find it necessary to acquire in order to “maintain his state” and to “achieve great things”, the two standard markers of power for him. This makes it brutally clear there can be no equivalence between the conventional virtues and Machiavellian virtù. Machiavelli’s sense of what it is to be a person of virtù can thus be summarized by his recommendation that the prince above all else must possess a “flexible disposition”. That ruler is best suited for office, on Machiavelli’s account, who is capable of varying her/his conduct from good to evil and back again “as fortune and circumstances dictate” (Prince CW 66; see Nederman and Bogiaris 2018). Not coincidentally, Machiavelli also uses the term virtù in his book The Art of War in order to describe the strategic prowess of the general who adapts to different battlefield conditions as the situation dictates. Machiavelli sees politics to be a sort of a battlefield on a different scale.”
What is the conceptual link between virtù and the effective exercise of power for Machiavelli? The answer lies with another central Machiavellian concept, Fortuna (usually translated as “fortune”). Fortuna is the enemy of political order, the ultimate threat to the safety and security of the state. Machiavelli’s use of the concept has been widely debated without a very satisfactory resolution. Suffice it to say that, as with virtù, Fortuna is employed by him in a distinctive way. Where conventional representations treated Fortuna as a mostly benign, if fickle, goddess, who is the source of human goods as well as evils, Machiavelli’s fortune is a malevolent and uncompromising fount of human misery, affliction, and disaster. While human Fortuna may be responsible for such success as human beings achieve, no man can act effectively when directly opposed by the goddess (Discourses CW 407–408).
manifests in Fortuna
Nederman, Cary, “Niccolò Machiavelli“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).