[4.7.2] Philip the Chancellor on the Good and Virtues

Philip the Chancellor (1160?-1236 AD) in the work Summa de bono elaborates a theory of transcendentals (see also [4.7.1]), and gives a detailed analysis of goodness and virtues:

  • Transcendentals are properties to be found in all and every thing: being, unity, good, truth
  • they are convertible to each other, are coextensional meaning that “whatever has being also has unity, truth, and goodness”,
  • the division of the transcendentals exists only in the human mind.
  • Good can be of divided intos goods by nature, by agent action and by grace.
  • Theological virtues (faith, hope, charity) and cardial virtues (rudence, fortitude, temperance, modesty, sobriety, continence, virginity, justice) are goods by grace.

The following OntoUML diagram presents Philip the Chancellor’s theory of goodness and virtues:

Philip the Chancellor on the good and virtues
ClassDescriptionRelations
ThingA thing is an individual (otherwise particular).
GodGodsubkind of Thing; provides GoodByGrace
AngelAngelsubkind of Thing
HumanHumansubkind of Thing
Transcendental“Certain properties fall into none of Aristotle’s categories; rather they are properties of all of the things to which the categories are applicable. For this reason, these properties are said to ‘transcend’ the categories [transcendental].”
Being“The concept of being is fundamental in that the concepts of the other transcendentals presuppose it.”subkind of Transcendental; characterizes (each and every) Thing
Good“Although there is some variation in what is counted as a transcendental, the list generally included being, unity, truth, and goodness. Thus, everything that falls into any of Aristotle’s categories is a being, has a certain sort of unity, and is true and good to a certain extent.
Not only do these properties transcend the categories and as a result, apply to everything classified by the categories, but they are held to be convertible with each other as well. This could mean one of two things. The transcendentals could be coextensional, so that whatever has being also has unity, truth, and goodness. This leaves open the possibility that the transcendentals are separate and distinct from one another. The second option of the convertibility thesis involves a stronger claim, namely, the idea that the transcendentals differ from one another only in concept, not in reality. Unity, truth, and goodness add nothing to a particular being over and above what is already there; everything that is a being is also one, true, and good in virtue of the very same characteristics. […] The various transcendentals do not differ in reality, only in concept. The concept of being is fundamental in that the concepts of the other transcendentals presuppose it. However, the concepts of all of the other transcendentals add a certain basic notion to the notion of being in order to differentiate them from being (see Aertsen 2012, MacDonald 1992). This basic notion is the notion of being that is undivided. Because this is a purely negative notion, it picks out no additional property in reality. The addition of indivision alone yields the concept of unity. To derive the concepts of the true and the good, one adds further the notion of the appropriate cause. The concept of truth involves the idea of the formal cause, that is, the cause in virtue of which matter is enformed, and a thing becomes what it is. Things are true, that is, genuine instances of the kind of thing they are to the extent that they instantiate the form of things of that kind. Thus, the concept of truth is the concept of being that is undivided from a formal cause. Goodness, on the other hand, has to do with being that is undivided from a final cause, that is, a cause that has to do with goals or ends, especially those goals that have been brought to fulfillment. Everything has a particular nature, that is, properties that make that thing a thing of that type. But things can exemplify those properties to a greater or lesser extent. Philip claims that everything has as its goal its own perfection, which means that things move toward exemplifying their specifying characteristics to the greatest extent possible. To the extent that a thing does so, that thing will be good. But that thing will also have being to the same extent. Thus, goodness and being in a given thing coincide in reality, and a thing’s goodness adds nothing over and above the thing’s being. But of course, goodness and being involve two different concepts. Thus, being and goodness have the same extension while differing intensionally. […]
Philip adopts the second notion of convertibility. The various transcendentals do not differ in reality, only in concept. The concept of being is fundamental in that the concepts of the other transcendentals presuppose it.
subkind of Transcendental; characterizes Being
GoodByNatureGoods by nature are: “good retained by creatures by virtue of their natures (bonum nature). In turn, these goods fall into two categories: those goods that cannot be diminished by evil and those goods that can be lost through evil.”subkind of Good
CannotDiminishedByEvilGoods that cannot be diminished by evil are the properties of angels.subkind of GoodByNature; characterizes Angel
LostThroughEvilGoods that can be lost through evil are the properties of human beings. “Those goods that can be affected by evil are discussed in conjunction with Adam’s fall from grace in the Garden and its consequences.”subkind of GoodByNature; characterizes Human
GoodByAgentActionGood by agent’s action: “Philip considers what he calls bonum in genere. Although this sort of good has a rather peculiar title, the bonum in genere represents goods that come about as a result of an agent’s actions. These goods have this title because what determines whether a given act is good depends not only on the sort of act it is (its ‘form’ so to speak) but also what the act has to do with (its ‘matter’ so to speak), thus suggesting that these sorts of goods can be classified along the lines of genera and species. Moreover, these sorts of generic goods contrast with the meritorious goods brought about as the result of God’s grace.” subkind of Good
GoodByGraceThere are goods by grace provided by God: “Philip goes on to look at the good that is associated with grace. Here, he divides his treatment into the graces that pertain to angels (as well as their ministries) and the graces that pertain to human beings. Philip includes the virtues in his discussion of human graces.”subkind of Good
GraceForHumans “graces that pertain to human beings”mediates God with GoodByGrace; results Virtue
Virtue“Although he denies that the virtues are a type of grace, he includes them in this section because virtues come about as a result of grace working within human beings.”subkind of GoodByGrace; characterizes Human
TheologicalVirtue“This idea is most naturally associated with the theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, and indeed, Philip discusses these virtues here at some length.”subkind of Virtue
CardinalVirtuePhilip discusses “cardinal virtues: prudence, fortitude, temperance (and the associated virtues of modesty, sobriety, continence, and virginity), and justice, virtues which one might argue have no direct connection with grace. Philip admits that strictly speaking cardinal virtues are not divine virtues since they have to do with what is for the sake of the end and not directly with the end itself (the end of course being God). But he argues that justice has to do both with God and with human governance; perhaps because of this connection, he felt justified in including them in a broader discussion of grace”subkind of Virtue

Sources

  • All citations from: McCluskey, Colleen, “Philip the Chancellor”The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

First published: 3/2/2022

[4.18.8] Wiliam Ockham on Virtues and Will

William Ockham (1285-1349 AD), in the treatise On the Connection of the Virtues and other works, elaborates a will-based ethics, where acts of will (intentions), and not actions have ethical value:

  • Human beings have a natural tendency to achieve their ultimate good, like at Aristotle [1.3.17] and Augustine [2.6.5]
  • The human will creates acts of will (intentions), which on their turn initiate ethically neutral actions. Acts of will can be virtuous and evil.
  • Virtuous acts of will manifest moral virtue, and are subordinated to the ultimate good. Ockham “measures” moral virtue in a five-grade scale. Even pagans can have moral virtue, howeve that is not enough for salvation.
  • Despite the human inclination towards the ultimate good, the human will is free to deliberately go against the zltimate good, and the choose evil. This theory antagonizes with the view on the limitations of the will held by Aquinas [4.9.9], [4.9.13].

The following OntoUML diagram presents Ockhams’s model of virtues and free will:

Ockham on virtues and will
ClassDescriptionRelations
HumanA human personhas UltimateGood
UltimateGood“Ockham [..] is very suspicious of the notion of final causality (teleology) in general, he thinks it is quite appropriate for intelligent, voluntary agents such as human beings. Thus the frequent charge that Ockham severs ethics from metaphysics by denying teleology seems wrong. Nevertheless, while Ockham grants that human beings have a natural orientation, a tendency toward their own ultimate good, he does not think this restricts their choices.”participates in VirtuousActOfWill
Will“Ockham’s ethics combines a number of themes. For one, it is a will-based ethics in which intentions [will] count for everything and external behavior or actions count for nothing. In themselves, all actions are morally neutral.”component of Human; creates ActOfWill
ActOfWillFor Ockham, acts of will are morally virtuous either extrinsically, i.e. derivatively, through their conformity to some more fundamental act of will, or intrinsically. On pain of infinite regress, therefore, extrinsically virtuous acts of will must ultimately lead back to an intrinsically virtuous act of will. That intrinsically virtuous act of will, for Ockham, is an act of “loving God above all else and for his own sake.”ActOfWill initiates Action
Action“In themselves, all actions are morally neutral.”
VirtuousActOfWill“For Ockham, acts of will are morally virtuous [virtuous act of will] either extrinsically, i.e. derivatively, through their conformity to some more fundamental act of will, or intrinsically.”inherits from ActOfWill
ExtrinsicalVirtuousActOfWill“On pain of infinite regress, therefore, extrinsically virtuous acts of will must ultimately lead back to an intrinsically virtuous act of will. ”inherits from VirtuousActOfWill; leads to IntrinsicalVirtuousActOfWill
IntrinsicalVirtuousActOfWill“That intrinsically virtuous act of will, for Ockham, is an act of ‘loving God above all else and for his own sake.’inherits from VirtuousActOfWill
MoralVirtuemoral virtue is possible even for the pagan, moral virtue is not by itself enough for salvation. In short, there is no necessary connection between virtue—moral goodness—and salvation. Ockham repeatedly emphasizes that ‘God is a debtor to no one‘; he does not owe us anything, no matter what we do.”manifests in VirtuousActOfWill
GradeOfMoralVirtueIn his early work, On the Connection of the Virtues, Ockham distinguishes five grades or stages of moral virtue, which have been the topic of considerable speculation in the secondary literature:
1/ The first and lowest stage is found when someone wills to act in accordance with “right reason”—i.e., because it is “the right thing to do.”
2/ The second stage adds moral “seriousness” to the picture. The agent is willing to act in accordance with right reason even in the face of contrary considerations, even—if necessary—at the cost of death.
3/ The third stage adds a certain exclusivity to the motivation; one wills to act in this way only because right reason requires it. It is not enough to will to act in accordance with right reason, even heroically, if one does so on the basis of extraneous, non-moral motives.
4/ At the fourth stage of moral virtue, one wills to act in this way “precisely for the love of God.” This stage “alone is the true and perfect moral virtue of which the Saints speak.”
5/ The fifth and final stage can be built immediately on either the third or the fourth stage; thus one can have the fifth without the fourth stage. The fifth stage adds an element of extraordinary moral heroism that goes beyond even the “seriousness” of stage two.
characterizes MoralVirtue
ChoiceOfEvil“For Ockham, as for Aristotle and Aquinas, I can choose the means to achieve my ultimate good. But in addition, for Ockham unlike Aristotle and Aquinas, I can choose whether to will that ultimate good. The natural orientation and tendency toward that good is built in; I cannot do anything about that. But I can choose whether or not to to act to achieve that good. I might choose, for example, to do nothing at all, and I might choose this knowing full well what I am doing. But more: I can choose to act knowingly directly against my ultimate good, to thwart it. I can choose evil as evil. [choice of evil]inherits from ActOfWill

Sources:

  • All citations from: Spade, Paul Vincent and Claude Panaccio, “William of Ockham”The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

First published: 13/1/2022