[3.1] Saadya Gaon on Sources of Knowledge and Types of Law

Saadya Gaon (882-942 AD) on his magnum opus “The Book of Doctrines and Beliefs” (Kitâb al-Amânât wal-‘I‘tiqâdât) presents a theory of the sources of knowledge, and the relation of knowledge to the commandments, prohibitions provided to humans by prophets through revelation. He thinks that reason and revelation are strengthening each other, providing thus for the faithful the necessary certainty to conduct a good life.

The following OntoUML diagram shows Saadya’s main concepts in the topic of Knowledge and Law.

Saadya on sources of knowledge and types of law
ClassDescriptionRelations
SourceOf
Knowledge
Saadya names 4 sources of knowledge: sense perception, reason, inference and tradition.
Sense
Perception
Sense perception is the most direct source of knowledge.
E.g. I see smoke in the woods, so I know there is smoke in the woods.
is SourceOf
Knowledge
ReasonReason is a source of knowledge in 2 ways:
– can grasp truth by itself,
– can infer based on sense perception. E.g. I see smoke in the woods, so using reason I infer that there is fire in the woods.
mediates between SensePerception
and Inference; is SourceOfKnowledge
InferenceInference is source of knowledge.
E.g. I know that there is fire in the woods.
is SourceOf
Knowledge
Reliable
Tradition
Reliable tradition (al-kabar): “comes to a person (or a group) all at once (as opposed to being a process unfolding in time, as is the case for the other 3 modes of knowing). Furthermore, knowledge received from tradition is not only immediately received, but is additionally immediately certain to its recipient(s)”
Saadya identifies tradition with the Jewish Bible, and the rabbinic writings.
is SourceOf
Knowledge;
is associated with Revelation
RevelationRevelation comes from divine sources to prophets, and is source of reliable tradition.is associated with Tradition
Commandment
Prohibition
Commandments, prohibitions (among other texts) are parts of the Tradition. is part of the
Tradition; is Law
LawOfReason“The ‘laws of reason‘… are essentially characterized there as commandments and prohibitions in the Bible whose reasons could be arrived at independently by any rational human being. In other words, these are laws which ought to ‘make sense’ to any reasonable person, and, as such, are basic (one might say, natural) moral laws which, left to our own devices, we ought come up with on our own. Examples of such laws are the prohibitions against murder, adultery, theft, and lying.”
The laws of reason are contained in the tradition, this way “helped by revelation”, and also the other way around: revelation is helped by reason.
is Commandment
Prohibition; is associated with Reason
LawsOf
Revelation
Laws of revelation: “consists of matters regarding which reason passes no judgment in the way either of approval or disapproval so far as their essence is concerned…
Saadya gives as examples of such laws: the laws demarcating Sabbath and other festival days as separate from ‘ordinary’ days, rules about who gets chosen as a prophet and/or leader, the Jewish dietary laws, certain sexual prohibitions, and laws of purity and impurity… Saadya stresses that even the most rational moral ideal is beset with vagueness about the details of how best to effect the sought after result; and so, while reason can tell us that we ought not commit adultery, it doesn’t necessarily provide us with the sorts of ‘when, where and how’ details that are needed to translate even the best moral theory into actual practice.”
is Commandment
Prohibition
LawCommandments and Prohibitions are Laws (sharî‘a).

Sources

First published: 04/07/2019

[2.7.3] Boethius on Universals

Boethius (477-525 AD), in his second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge (see [2.5]) presented a theory of universals characterized by moderate realism, responding to Porphyry’s questions:

Porphyry’s questionsUniversals according to Boethius
(a) whether genera and species [universals] are real or are situated in bare thoughts aloneare in the mind
(b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporealsare incorporeals
(c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with themare in connection with the sensibles

Boethius model of universals is in the following OntoUML diagram:

Boethius on universals
Class/PackageDescriptionRelations
MindThe “separation in thought of those things that cannot be separated in reality is the process of abstraction. In general, by means of the process of abstraction, our mind (in particular, the faculty of our mind Aristotle calls active intellect (nous poietikos, in Greek, intellectus agens, in Latin) is able to form universal representations of particular objects by disregarding what distinguishes them, and conceiving of them only in terms of those of their features in respect of which they do not differ from one another.” (Klima 2017)
Universalsuniversals are regarded as universal mental representations existing in the mind […]. On this Aristotelian conception, universals need not be thought of as somehow sharing their being with all their distinct particulars, for their being simply consists in their being thought of, or rather, the particulars’ being thought of in a universal manner. This is what Boethius expresses by saying in his final replies to Porphyry’s questions the following:
‘… genera and species subsist in one way, but are understood in an another. They are incorporeal, but subsist in sensibles [individuals], joined to sensibles [individuals]. They are understood, however, as subsisting by themselves, and as not having their being in others.” (Klima 2017)
Genus“The genus is the part of the real definition that answers the broad question What is it? What is man? Man is an animal.” (see also [2.5])(Spade 2009)in the (part of the) Mind; is in a recursive association with itself; each level splits the superior level in 2 or more, based on the attributes marked in Difference
Species“Man is a most specific species. Below man there are only individual men, not yet lower species. What this means, of course, is that the differences among individual men are not essential differences but accidental ones. If they were essential differences, then we would have lower species after all.” (see also [2.5]) (Spade 2009)subkind of Genus; subsists in, joined to Individual
Individual“Below man [as species] there are only individual men, not yet lower species. What this means, of course, is that the differences among individual men are not essential differences but accidental ones.” (see also [2.5]) (Spade 2009)

Related posts in theory of Universals: [1.2.2], [1.3.1], [1.3.2], [2.5], [2.7.3], [4.3.1], [4.3.2], [4.4.1][4.5.2], [4.9.8]

Sources

  • Klima, Gyula, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
  • Spade, Paul Vincent, “History of the Problem of Universals in the Middle Ages”, Indiana University 2009

First published: 04/06/2020