Christian

[4.1.1] Eriugena on Free Will and Predestination

A. L. KomáromiLeave a comment

Irish monk and philosopher John Scottus Eriugena (800? – 877? AD) in its work “De divina praedestinatione” debates the theory of the double predestination (see [2.5.6]) by proposed by Augustine and sustained by Gottschalk. He argues for simple predestination (for Salvation), because:

  • God is one all-good substance, and as such, can not have knowledge of evil. His knowing is His acting; he can not predestine humans to damnation. He wants all humans to be saved.
  • God’s atemporal foreknowledge can only be good in itself; foreknowledge does not mean predetermination.
  • Humans have free will, can choose good and evil, but for choosing the good they have to accept the divine grace.

Eriugena’s theory of simple predestination is presented in the following OntoUML diagram:

Eriugena on free will and predestination
ClassDescriptionRelations
God“Eriugena rejects any divine predestination to evil by an appeal to God’s unity, transcendence, and goodness. […] Eriugena argues in De divina praedestinatione that ‘God, being perfectly good, wants all humans to be saved, and does not predestine souls to damnation.’ Since God is outside time, He cannot be said to fore-know or to pre-destine, terms that involve temporal predicates. Furthermore, if God’s being is His wisdom, God can be said to have but a single knowledge and hence a ‘double’ predestination cannot be ascribed to Him.” (Moran, Guiu 2019)provides Grace; wants Salvation
Grace“divine grace as an aid to the free-will to choose the good” (Moran, 1989)
SalvationSalvation
DamnationDamnation is, “when the imperfect judgment chooses sin, it consigns itself to darkness, and the punishment for sin is nothing other than the sin itself. […] Punishment is simply the absence of beatitude, and the sinful soul remains trapped after death in the region of fire, the fourth element of the material world” (Moran, 1989)
FreeWillThe human soul has free will: “For God did not create in man a captive will but a free one, and that freedom remained after sin” (De divina praedestinatione, 4.6).characterizes FreeChoice
FreeChoiceHumans have free choice (liberum arbitrium) even in the present, fallen condition.
ChooseGoodHumans souls are able to choose good if they accept the help of the Divine Grace. subkind of FreeChoice; accepts Grace; results Salvation
ChooseSinHuman souls damn themselves through their own sinful choices: “Sin, death, unhappiness are not from God.”subkind of FreeChoice; results Damnation

Sources

First published: 07/05/2020

[2.7.2] Boethius on Topical Logic

A. L. Komáromi1 Comment

The area of topical logic, – like many others – was founded by Aristotle in his work “Topics”, and continued by Cicero and Boethius, whose work exercised an enormous influence on medieval logic.
The aim of topical logic is to provide a practical heuristic method for finding credible, plausible (not necessarily true) arguments which can be used in situations where persuasion is needed, e.g. in a legal process. Boethius, in his book “On Topical Differentiae” presents topical arguments in a quasi-syllogistic structure, thus finding a good argument is identifying the middle term which links the extremes (see [1.3.9]).

The following OntoUML diagram presents the main concepts in the Topical Logic of Boethius (477-525 AD):

Boethius on topical logic
ClassDescription Relations
TopicTopic (locus) can be Differentiae and Maximal Sentences.
DifferentiaeTopical Differentiae are the common, caracteristic, distinctive feature, which classifies the Arguments, and the MaximalSentences also.
Boethius lists over 30 Differentiae, like:
– “from the lesser”
– “from an efficient cause”
– “definition”

A Differentiae is assotiated with at least one MaximalSentence; and with 0, 1 or many Arguments
MaximalSenteceMaximal Sentence (maxima propositio) is a Topic which is somehow shown to be universal or readily plausible. This way “will help to suggest exactly what sort of argument can be made using the differentia in question”, gives power to the Argument.
E.g. for the Differentiae “from an efficient cause” he lifts the following Maximal Sentences:
– “Those tings who have a natural efficient cause are themselves also natural.”
– “Where there is the cause, the effect cannot be ansent.”
– “Everything should be considered according to its causes.”
ArgumentArguments are credible, acceptable inferences, whose premises can be valid, or commonly accepted, (not necessarily valid) assertions (see [1.3.9]). Each Argument contains a MiddleTerm
MiddleTermSee in [1.3.9] also: The term shared by the premises is the Middle Term. MiddleTerm is are a role of a Term
TermSee in [1.3.9] also: Subjects and predicates of Arguments are Terms which can be either individual, e.g. Socrates, or universal, e.g. human. Subjects may be individual or universal, but predicates can only be universals.

The UML activity diagram below shows the heuristic process of topical logic:

Boethius: heuristics of topical logic

Sources

  • All citations from: Marenbon, John, Boethius, Oxford University Press, 2003
  • Case presented in Activity Diagram from: Marenbon, John, “Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta

First published: 27/06/2019