[6.7.4] Bernardino Telesio on God

Bernardino Telesio (1509–1588) wrote about a God who does not act in nature, (however miracles might occur)-

“Whereas medieval and Renaissance authors often seemed to rely on the double-truth theory in order to maintain the freedom of scientific research and teaching, Telesio maintained a purely scientific approach. But he did not deny the existence of God and of the human soul [spirit]. Telesio’s God is not the God who acts in nature and history, though he did not deny the possibility of miracles (DRN book IV, ch. XXV; vol. I, p. 176). The God Telesio seems to imagine can be compared to a mechanic. Just as the best mechanic creates an artefact which will work without interruption and default, so the power of the almighty divine artist is represented in a cosmos which is able to generate and to sustain itself without ever running the danger of corruption (see DRN book I, ch. X).”

  • God might perform miracles.
  • The Cosmos depends on God.
  • A thing is component of cosmos.
  • A human is a subkind of thing.
  • Spirit and immortal soul are components of humans.
  • Immortal soul depends on God.

The following OntoUML diagram shows Telesio’s model of God-

Telesio on God
ClassDescriptionRelations
God“Telesio maintained a purely scientific approach. But he did not deny the existence of God and of the human soul [spirit]. Telesio’s God is not the God who acts in nature and history, though he did not deny the possibility of miracles (DRN book IV, ch. XXV; vol. I, p. 176). The God Telesio seems to imagine can be compared to a mechanic. Just as the best mechanic creates an artefact which will work without interruption and default, so the power of the almighty divine artist is represented in a cosmos which is able to generate and to sustain itself without ever running the danger of corruption (see DRN book I, ch. X).”creates Miracle
MiracleMiracles are possible: “Telesio’s God is not the God who acts in nature and history, though he did not deny the possibility of miracles (DRN book IV, ch. XXV; vol. I, p. 176).”
ImmortalSoul“Besides the natural soul or spirit Telesio accepted the existence of an immortal soul superimposed by God (DRN book V, ch. II–III). But in his theory of psychology and ethics the soul does not play any significant role, for which reason researchers have often held it to be an addition designed to avoid conflicts with the Church.
On the other hand, there do exist certain modes of behavior which cannot be explained in a purely naturalistic and materialistic way, such as the human striving for eternity and the martyrs’ denial of the highest objective of self-preservation. But far from building a bridge to the philosophical tradition, Telesio’s definition of a second, divinely superimposed soul as “forma corporis et praecipue spiritus” deals a deathblow to Aristotle’s teachings. According to Telesio, the idea of an immortal soul was totally unknown to the heathen Aristotle, who is severely criticized for confusing the concept of a natural spirit with the religious idea of a soul (DRN book V, ch. II–III):
And when we have reproved Aristotle and will continue to reprove him for having introduced the soul into the body as its peculiar form, we have not condemned him and we will not condemn him because he equated the soul created by God (a thing which one might suspect was completely unknown to him) with the form of humans, but rather because… he equated the soul which was generated from the semen and which is the only one which senses, causes movements and is (so to speak) something akin to the semen, with the form of the body. (Vol. II, p. 218f.)
Nonetheless, the few pages which Telesio dedicated to the immortal soul do not open a path to metaphysical or theological theories. “
componentOf Human; historicalDependence on God
Cosmos“Just as the best mechanic creates an artefact which will work without interruption and default, so the power of the almighty divine artist is represented in a cosmos which is able to generate and to sustain itself without ever running the danger of corruption (see DRN book I, ch. X).”historicalDependence on God
Thing“Telesio’s vision of the genesis of nature is simple to the point of being archaic, yet at the same time astonishingly modern in the sense that he seems to have been one of the very first defenders of a theory of natural evolution without metaphysical or theological presuppositions. According to his De rerum natura, the only things which must be presupposed are passive matter and active force, the latter of which Telesio thought of as twofold, heat and cold.”componentOf Cosmos
Human“And just as there is no metaphysical difference between living and non-living bodies, there also does not exist a qualitative difference between animals and humans—in both, it is the same spirit which coordinates the functions and operations of the different bodily parts.”subkind of Thing
Spirit“According to Telesio, the soul [ie spirit] is a separate being, but not in the sense of the Platonists, who define it as an immortal essence acting as the governor and mover of the body during its embodied life. Telesio held the soul to be a specific part of the body, defining it as the spiritus coursing through the nervous system and having its main seat in the brain”componentOf Human

Sources

  • Boenke, Michaela, “Bernardino Telesio“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

First published: 15/12/2022

[6.6.2] Pierro Pomonazzi on Fate

Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525) in 1520, completed De fato, de libero arbitrio, et de praedestinatione (On Fate, Free Will, and Predestination), where he stated, that:

  • God is the efficient cause of the world
  • Celestial and sublunary bodies depend on God
  • Humans are sublunary bodies and are characterized by a lack of free will.

The following OntoUML diagram shows Pomponazzi’s model on the absence of free will:

Pomonazzi on free will
CLASSDESCRIPTIONDESCRIPTION
GodGod is the efficient cause of the world
EfficientCauseGod is the efficient cause of the world role of God
CelestialBodyOn Fate, Pomponazzi argued that God, as the efficient cause of the world, acts on the sublunary world using the celestial bodies.subkind of Body
SublunaryBody“On Fate, Pomponazzi argued that God, as the efficient cause of the world, acts on the sublunary [bodies] world using the celestial bodies. God is the principal cause, and the celestial bodies are the instrumental cause of accidental effects in the celestial bodies. world, which Alexander and Thomas Aquinas viewed as contingent and without a cause (1.7.II/15). The celestial bodies’ motion, contiguous to the lower world, drives and determines alterations on earth. Therefore, accidental effects, ultimately resulting from God acting as an efficient cause, occur by necessity (1.7.II/16). Pomponazzi maintained that they are mistakenly called contingent as a result of human ignorance of causes and future events but not from any irregularity in matter, natural powers, or celestial influences. Rather, all accidental effects and what appears to result from luck or chance can be traced back to fixed causes
(1.7.II/23–26).”
subkind of Body
BodyA sublunary or celestial body. subkind of Human
HumanA human person
LackOfFreeWillLack of free will:
“Pomponazzi maintained that human will functions just like the rest of nature. It depends on an eternal, external mover, namely God’s will and the celestial motions (1.9.2.10).
Just as for other natural beings, if there is a potentiality and no impediment, by necessity the potentiality will be realized. Thus, the human will reacts to external factors according to its powers and the absence of impediments (1.9.2.12). Consequently, the human will depends on higher, universal causes. The apparent ability of humans to deliberate between choices using reason, however, is an illusion because every actor is in fact directed toward one of the choices by external causes (1.9.3.2–4).
The rejection of the existence of free will presented difficult ramifications for Christian ethics and theology, which depend on the freedom to choose a virtuous life. In resolving these difficulties, Pomponazzi chose fate over freedom because he thought that it better preserved God’s complete power and providence. If God had granted freedom to humans, the lack, or extreme rarity, of truly virtuous humans on earth demonstrates the absence of a truly providential plan in which humans’ freedom to choose a completely moral good life is realized. Similarly, if humans have the ability of free choice, God must not know these future decisions and humans are thereby limited with respect to his knowledge and power. As a consequence, Pomponazzi opted for fate and determinism, rejecting what he considered to be a denial of God’s providence, omnipotence, and omniscience. The world’s order and the cosmic laws that govern the eternal motions of the universe include the existence of good and evil as part of the necessary cycles of change.”
characterizes human

Sources

  • Martin, Craig, “Pietro Pomponazzi“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

First published: 05/11/2022