[3.2.4] Al-Farabi on Actualization of the Intellect

Al-Fārābī’s (872-950 AD) views on the different phases of the intellect are to be found in The Treatise on the Intellect (Risālah fi’l-‘aql). He borrows the idea from Alexander (however, he wrongly attributes it to Aristotle) that the human intellect’s evolution progresses in three phases: material, actual, and acquired. For the realization of the last – acquired – phase, the help of higher, non-human intellect – the active intellect is needed (see also [3.2.2]). 

These phases are presented in the following OntoUML diagram:

Al-Farabi on actualization of the intellect
ClassDescriptionRelations
HumanIntellectHuman intellect (arabic: aql, greek: νοῦς) “is understood as a faculty of the soul by means of which certainty about necessary, true, and universal premises is attained. Premises of this kind are not arrived at by means of syllogisms, but are present in the subject in a prior way, either by nature or without one being aware of how these premises were acquired. Hence, this faculty is some part of the soul by which humans have access to the first principles of the theoretical sciences.”   
MaterialIntellectMaterial intellect (arabic:‘”aql bi-l-quwah“): “Following Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition, al-Fārābī describes the intellect as being itself potential or, using Alexander’s terminology, an innate ‘natural disposition’ […]. This kind of intellect is frequently called “potential”, “material”, or “passive”, and is simply the rational faculty with which all human beings are endowed.
In The Treatise on the Intellect al-Fārābī refers to the material intellect (νοῦς ὑλικὸς, a Greek term coined by Alexander) as a soul or part of the soul, or one of the faculties of the soul, or something that is in potency to abstract the forms from their matter and turning these into forms for itself”
is phase of HumanIntellect
ActualIntellectActual intellect (arabic: ‘aql bi’l-fi‘l): “When these forms are abstracted, they become intelligibles or forms for the material intellect. It can be rightly said that for al-Fārābī the material intellect is like the matter where the abstracted forms come to be, where the material intellect itself becomes the abstracted forms, just as the imprinted object leaves its mark on a piece of wax.
Before a form of the objects outside the soul has been abstracted, the material intellect is just in potency to receive those forms or potential intelligibles; but when these latter come to be in the material intellect, the material intellect becomes an actual intellect, and the potential intelligibles are actualized. Now, the existence of actual intelligibles is different from their existence as potential intelligibles or forms in matter. When external to the soul and linked to matter, forms are affected by place, time, position, quantity, and the like. But when forms are actualized in the soul, many of these qualities are removed and their existence thus becomes different from their former existence as forms of bodies outside the soul.”
is phase of HumanIntellect; abstracts FormLinkedToMatter
AcquiredIntellectAcquired intellect (arabic: ‘aql al-mustafāḍ): “the process of abstraction is not required in the case of forms separate from matter, that is, the separate entities that belong to the supralunar realm. These separate forms are grasped by the intellect not as actual intellect but as the acquired intellect, and thus become forms for it. Moreover, the acquired intellect is a perfection of the human intellect because it has no need to perform the activity of abstraction in order to grasp forms existing separately from matter. In other words, it is the acquired intellect that enables the grasping of separate forms through the assistance of the active intellect.” is phase of HumanIntellect; grasps FormSeparate
FromMatter
FormForm (arabic: ‘aql al-fa ‘‘āl): “In The Political Regime al-Fārābī deals with the relation between matter and form, and explains that form is the actualization of matter in the sense that form is more excellent than matter; however, matter is the substratum of form and without matter there is no form […]. As can be seen, al-Fārābī is a partisan of Aristotelian hylomorphism” (see also [1.3.5])
FormLinkedToMatterForms linked to matter are external to the soul, and “are affected by place, time, position, quantity, and the like. […] forms linked to matter have to be abstracted in order to become actual intelligibles in the actual intellect.”is subkind of Form
FormSeparate
FromMatter
Forms separate from matter can be e.g. the forms of celestial bodies (see [3.2.1]): “the process of abstraction is not required in the case of forms separate from matter, that is, the separate entities that belong to the supralunar realm.”is subkind of Form
ActiveIntellectActive intellect is emanated by the second intellect (see [3.2.1]), and helps the grasping of forms separated from matter by the acquired intellect.contains FormSeparate
FromMatter; helps AcquiredIntellect

Sources

First published: 6/2/2020

[2.2.7] Virtue, Vice and Indifferent in Stoic Ethics

Stoic virtue ethics teaches that relative to the goal of living for a sage (see [2.2.1]):

  • virtue is the only good thing, necessary and sufficient for a happy life,
  • however, there are preferred indifferent things, those who hold value.

The OntoUML diagram below presents the main categories of stoic virtue ethics:

Virtue, vice and indifferent in stoic ethics
ClassDescriptionRelations
Human A human person has a goal of living. has GoalOfLiving; participates in Indifferent
GoalOfLiving“Aristotle’s ethics provides the form for the adumbration of the ethical teaching of the Hellenistic schools. One must first provide a specification of the goal or end (telos) of living.is (relates to) Happiness
Happiness“A bit of reflection tells us that the goal that we all have is happiness or flourishing (eudaimonia). But what is happiness?… Zeno’s answer was ‘a good flow of life’ or ‘living in agreement,’ and Cleanthes clarified that with the formulation that the end was ‘living in agreement with nature’. Chrysippus amplified this to (among other formulations) ‘living in accordance with experience of what happens by nature;’ later Stoics inadvisably, in response to Academic attacks, substituted such formulations as ‘the rational selection of the primary things according to nature.'”characterizes Human
Knowledge“Stoics identify the moral virtues with knowledge. […] Thus a specific virtue like moderation is defined as ‘the science (epistêmê) of what is to be chosen and what is to be avoided and what is neither of these’ (Arius Didymus, 61H). More broadly, virtue is ‘an expertise (technê) concerned with the whole of life’ (Arius Didymus, 61G). Like other forms of knowledge, virtues are characters of the soul’s commanding faculty which are firm and unchangeable.”characterizes Human
Virtue“The only things that are good are the characteristic excellences or virtues of human beings (or of human minds): prudence or wisdom, justice, courage and moderation, and other related qualities. “subkind of Knowledge
Prudence, Wisdom, Justice, Courage, ModerationPrudence, wisdom, justice, courage and moderation are virtuessubkind of Virtue
Good“The best way into the thicket of Stoic ethics is through the question of what is good, for all parties agree that possession of what is genuinely good secures a person’s happiness. The Stoics claim that whatever is good must benefit its possessor under all circumstances.” characterizes Virtue
Vice“only vice is genuinely bad” characterizes Human
Bad“only vice is genuinely badcharacterizes Vice
Indifferent “there are situations in which it is not to my benefit to be healthy or wealthy. (We may imagine that if I had money I would spend it on heroin which would not benefit me.) Thus, things like money are simply not good, in spite of how nearly everyone speaks, and the Stoics call them indifferents’ – i.e., neither good nor bad.” participates in Human
NotGood
NotBad
Not good and not bad characterizes Indifferent
Preferred
Indifferent
“Some indifferent things, like health or wealth, have value (axia) and therefore are to be preferred [indifferent], even if they are not good, because they are typically appropriate, fitting or suitable (oikeion) for us.”is Indifferent
Value Value (axia) is a property of being “appropriate, fitting or suitable (oikeion)”. characterizes PreferredIndifferent
NotPreferred Indifferent Indifferents not characterized by Value.is Indifferent

Sources

  • All citations from: Baltzly, Dirk, “Stoicism”The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

First published: 5/12/2019
Updated: 27/11/2020
Updated: 21/2/2022