Epistemology

[2.7.3] Boethius on Universals

A. L. KomáromiLeave a comment

Boethius (477-525 AD), in his second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge (see [2.5]) presented a theory of universals characterized by moderate realism, responding to Porphyry’s questions:

Porphyry’s questionsUniversals according to Boethius
(a) whether genera and species [universals] are real or are situated in bare thoughts aloneare in the mind
(b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporealsare incorporeals
(c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with themare in connection with the sensibles

Boethius model of universals is in the following OntoUML diagram:

Boethius on universals
Class/PackageDescriptionRelations
MindThe “separation in thought of those things that cannot be separated in reality is the process of abstraction. In general, by means of the process of abstraction, our mind (in particular, the faculty of our mind Aristotle calls active intellect (nous poietikos, in Greek, intellectus agens, in Latin) is able to form universal representations of particular objects by disregarding what distinguishes them, and conceiving of them only in terms of those of their features in respect of which they do not differ from one another.” (Klima 2017)
Universals“universals are regarded as universal mental representations existing in the mind […]. On this Aristotelian conception, universals need not be thought of as somehow sharing their being with all their distinct particulars, for their being simply consists in their being thought of, or rather, the particulars’ being thought of in a universal manner. This is what Boethius expresses by saying in his final replies to Porphyry’s questions the following:
‘… genera and species subsist in one way, but are understood in an another. They are incorporeal, but subsist in sensibles [individuals], joined to sensibles [individuals]. They are understood, however, as subsisting by themselves, and as not having their being in others.” (Klima 2017)
Genus“The genus is the part of the real definition that answers the broad question What is it? What is man? Man is an animal.” (see also [2.5])(Spade 2009)in the (part of the) Mind; is in a recursive association with itself; each level splits the superior level in 2 or more, based on the attributes marked in Difference
Species“Man is a most specific species. Below man there are only individual men, not yet lower species. What this means, of course, is that the differences among individual men are not essential differences but accidental ones. If they were essential differences, then we would have lower species after all.” (see also [2.5]) (Spade 2009)subkind of Genus; subsists in, joined to Individual
Individual“Below man [as species] there are only individual men, not yet lower species. What this means, of course, is that the differences among individual men are not essential differences but accidental ones.” (see also [2.5]) (Spade 2009)

Related posts in theory of Universals: [1.2.2], [1.3.1], [1.3.2], [2.5], [2.7.3], [4.3.1], [4.3.2], [4.4.1], [4.5.2], [4.9.8]

Sources

  • Klima, Gyula, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
  • Spade, Paul Vincent, “History of the Problem of Universals in the Middle Ages”, Indiana University 2009

First published: 04/06/2020

[2.6.2] St Augustine on Sign and Language

A. L. Komáromi1 Comment

Augustine’s (354-430 AD) semiotics, – as presented in De dialectica, De magistro, De doctrina christiana, De trinitate – axed on the general concept of the sign (be it natural, or conventional linguistic) emphasizes the practical usage of signs: human communication. The main concepts of his model:

  • Signs signify signified objects. They can be natural and conventional signs.
  • Conventional signs can be written, spoken words and other conventional signs.
  • Signs on the other hand relate to mental worlds and thoughts existing in the human soul.
  • Conventianal signs are used as means for communication by the sender and reciever souls.

The following OntoUML diagram presents Augtine’s model of language and signification:

Augustine on sign and language
ClassDesciptionRelations
SignA Sign (signum) is: “something that shows itself to the senses and something other than itself to the mind”.
An essential attribute of Signs is the sense (see [2.6.1]) with which a human can percept them.		generalizes NaturalSign and ConventionalSign; signify SignifiedObjectsand other Signs
SignifiedObjectThe Object, Thing signified by the Sign.
NaturalSign “Natural signs are those which, apart from any intention or desire of using them as signs, do yet lead to the knowledge of something else – as, for example, smoke when it indicates fire, the footprint of an animal passing by.”subkind of Sign
Conventional
Sign		“Conventional signs, …, are those which living beings mutually exchange in order to show, as well as they can, the feelings of their minds, or their perceptions, or their thoughts.”
Augustine sustains, that information transmitted with signs by a trustworthy Teacher (like textual information) is not enough for a true understanding (see also [2.6.1]).		subkind of Sign
SpokenWordSpoken word: “sign of something, which can be understood by the hearer when pronounced by the speaker.” subkind of ConvetionalSign
WrittenWord“Writing (litterae) [written word], introduced by man in order to impart permanency to spoken language, is just a secondary system of signs, consisting of ‘signs of words’ (signa verborum) rather than of words itself.” subkind of ConvetionalSign; signifies SpokenWord
Other
Conventional
Sign		Some signs “relate to the sense of sight, some to that of hearing, a very few to the other [conventional signs to other] senses” subkind of ConvetionalSign
ConventionConvention – in a given language – makes the relation between the Conventional Sign and the Signified Object. relates ConventionalSign and SignifiedObject
Mental-InteriorWord“It is … the mental (verbum mentis) or interior word (verbum interius), i.e., the mental concept, that is considered as word in its most proper sense, whereas the spoken word appears as a mere sign or voice of the word.” understands Sign; shared part of Thought
Thought“Thoughts (cogitationes) are performed in mental words”
Communication“spoken word signifies a concept that we have formed within our mind and communicates it to others”relates SenderSoul with RecieverSoul; uses Conventional
Sign
HumanSoulHuman soulthinks Thought; percepts NaturalSign
SenderSoulSender soul is the person who speaks, writes, sends other sign. The term Sender was not used by Augustine, he used the more particular speaker, writer.role of HumanSoul; listens, reads ConventionalSign
ReceiverSoulReceiver soul is the person who listens, reads, receives other sign. The term Receiver was not used by Augustine, he used the more particular listener, reader. role of HumanSoul; speaks, writes ConventionalSign

Sources

  • All citations from: Meier-Oeser, Stephan, “Medieval Semiotics“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
  • Mendelson, Michael, “Saint Augustine“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

First published: 30/5/2019
Updated: 13/6/2021
Updated: 14/9/2021, added communication