[3.2.5] Al-Farabi on Happiness

Al-Farabi’s (872-950 AD) views on the human happiness are spread through some of its works: The Political Regime (Kitāb al-siyāsa al-madaniyya), The Principles and Opinions of the People of the Virtuous City (Mabādi’ ārā’ ahl al-madīnah al-fāḍilah), and Attainment [of Happiness]. In these works:

  • He upholds the Aristotelian theory that each human person has a goal of living (telos), which is the ultimate felicity. This state can be reached just in the afterlife when the soul is separated from the body.
  • Ultimate felicity is the attainment of the actual phase of intellect (essentially the act of thinking – see [3.2.4]), not virtuous action (see [1.3.17]), virtue (see [2.2.7]), pleasure (see [2.1.3]), or love of God (see [2.5.5]), as for different other philosophers and schools.
  • Ultimate felicity is possible for all humans in the afterlife, if the person meets some preconditions, like exercising virtuous actions and having the right knowledge and opinions.

This structure is presented in the following OntoUML diagram:

ClassDescriptionRelations
Person“Prior to death, human beings [persons] are hybrids—corporeal entities, on the one hand, yet also immaterial, on the other, due to their intellects, that is, the rational faculty of their souls which survives death—and as such exposed to two sets of powers. Just like every other inhabitant of the sublunary world, human beings are subject to the natural laws determining corporeal substances. In contrast, however, to all the other species belonging to the sphere of generation and corruption, human beings moreover experience a certain influence by the so-called ‘active intellect’, an immaterial, incorruptible, supralunary entity whose existence is pure thinking. This active intellect does not affect the body of a human being, but rather her intellect and imagination, i.e., those psychic faculties involved in thinking. The most fundamental influence which the active intellect exerts on the human soul consists in, first, the provision and, second, the basic ‘formatting’ of the rational faculty:
… [the active intellect] gives the human being a faculty and a principle by which to strive, or by which the human being is able to strive on his own for the rest of the perfections that remain for him. That principle is the primary sciences and the primary intelligibles attained in the rational part of the soul. (Political Regime B, 1, 68: 62)” (Germann)
has GoalOfLiving; has HumanIntellect; pursuits EarthlyFelicity
GoalOfLiving“In line with Aristotle, al-Farabi leaves no doubt whatsoever that there is one kind of happiness which constitutes the telos [goal of living] of every human being.”(Germann)is UltimateFelicity
Happinessal-Farabi “distinguishes between ‘earthly’ and ‘ultimate felicity’ [happiness]“. (Germann)
EarthlyFelicityEarthly felicity is a subkind of Happiness, not relevant for the goal of living.subkind of Happiness
UltimateFelicity“from the majority of his writings it is clear that happiness in the strict sense of the word, that is, as the concomitant of the highest human perfection, is ultimate felicity.” (Germann)subkind of Happiness; is attainment of ActualIntellect; has Precondition
Precondition“As the last citation from the Perfect State conveys, when discussing the preconditions of felicity, al-Farabi distinguishes between (a) common and (b) specific duties of the citizens, as well as between (i) knowledge and (ii) activities.” (Germann)
Knowledge/
Opinion
Al-Farabi thinks that the people in the virtuous city should have virtuous knowledge or at least virtuous opinions: “The things in common which all the people of the excellent city ought to know are: (1) In the first place to know the First Cause and all its qualities; (2) then the immaterial existents [including the above mentioned active intellect] …; (3) the celestial substances …; (4) [without number in Walzer’s translation] then the natural bodies which are beneath them, and how they come to be and pass away …; (5) then the generation of man; (6) then the first ruler …; (7) then the rulers who have to take his place …; (8) then the excellent city and its people and the felicity which their souls ultimately reach …” (Perfect State V, 17, 1: 277–9)subkind of Precondition
KnowledgeOfObjectThe knowledge of the objects necessary for ultimate felicity “presupposes a quite profound knowledge of cosmology, physics, anthropology, and philosophy of society.” (Germann)
This knowledge is attainable just for a handful of people, who are intellectually gifted enough to do science.
subkind of Knowledge/
Opinion
KnowledgeOf
Symbolic
Representation
The knowledge of symbolic representations of objects necessary for ultimate felicity is attainable for every person, even modest intellectual capacity:
“according to al-Farabi, the requirement of knowing these common objects does not exclude anyone from attaining happiness, because they
‘… can be known in two ways, either by being impressed on [the people’s] souls as they really are or by being impressed on them through affinity and symbolic representation.‘ (Perfect State V, 17, 2: 279)” (Germann)
subkind of Knowledge/
Opinion
Action“There are some indications regarding the common activities […]. It appears that, once again in unison with Aristotle, these embrace all sorts of exercises suited to purify one’s soul while it is still unified with ‘its’ body, as al-Farabi’s references to the soul’s disposition as well as his recurrent comparisons with arts and crafts suggest. Thus, he intimates, in connection with the last quoted passage:
‘When each of [the people of the excellent city] acts in this way [i.e., according to the citizens’ common duties], these actions of his make him acquire a good and excellent disposition of the soul, and the more steadily he applies himself to them, the stronger and better becomes that disposition of this and increases in strength and excellence—just as steadily applying himself to performing the actions of writing well make a man acquire proficiency in the art of writing’ …. (Perfect State V, 16, 2: 261)” (Germann)
subkind of Precondition
ActualIntellect“And precisely in the realization of this activity, i.e., thinking, and its perfection—ideally, the attainment of its most sublime level, i.e., science—consists humanity’s telos. Human beings, hence, are born with the natural obligation to perfect their rational faculty. While they are equipped by the active intellect with this faculty and the principles of thought, their task consists in actualizing this potential, i.e., their intellects, “by which a human being is a human being” (Political Regime A, 2, 8: 32). Becoming an intellect in actuality, just like the active intellect and the other separate intelligences, therefore, constitutes humanity’s perfection. Once a human being reaches this level of perfection, she acquires the state of ultimate happiness:
‘When the rational faculty attains to being an intellect in actuality [actual intellect], that intellect it now is in actuality also becomes similar to the separate things and it intellects its essence that is [now] intellect in actuality. …. Through this, it becomes such as to be in the rank of the active intellect. And when a human being obtains this rank, his happiness is perfected. (Political Regime A, 2, 8: 33; square brackets thus in the translation)
Across al-Farabi’s various writings, it remains unclear whether this stage of ultimate felicity can already be reached during one’s lifetime, when the soul is still linked with the human body, or only in the hereafter, once the soul has separated from the body due to this latter’s death.
Happiness, consequently, consists in the as-perfect-as-possible assimilation of the human soul to the active intellect, whose unique activity is thinking.” (Germann)
phase of HumanIntellect
HumanIntellectHuman intellect (arabic: aql, greek: νοῦς) “is understood as a faculty of the soul by means of which certainty about necessary, true, and universal premises is attained. Premises of this kind are not arrived at by means of syllogisms, but are present in the subject in a prior way, either by nature or without one being aware of how these premises were acquired. Hence, this faculty is some part of the soul by which humans have access to the first principles of the theoretical sciences.” (López-Farjeat)  

Sources

First published: 27/07/2019

[2.6.6] St Augustine on Will and Predestination

St Agustine (354-430 AD) writes extensively about the importance of the will and free will a series of books (De civitate deiDe ordineDe beata vitaConfessionesDe trinitate), here are some highlights of his thoughts (see also [2.5.1]):

  • Love directs will towards an object (God, neighbor, self, etc.).
  • Will appears if assent (in the stoic sense) is given to the impulse (see [2.2.1])
  • First-order volitions within the human soul aimed to concrete objects can conflict, second-order volitions can solve this conflict.
  • Divine grace is necessary for restoring the freedom of the will for the fallen humankind.
  • God provides grace to the elected ones, who will be able to achieve salvation, and avoid damnation (theory of double predestination).

The OntoUML diagram below presents the main components of Augustine’s theory of the Will:

St Augustine on will
ClassDescriptionRelations
Love“In a more general way, love means the overall direction of our will (positively) toward [an object:] God or (negatively) toward ourselves or corporeal creature (De civitate dei 14.7; […]).” directs Will; in relation with Object
Will“Augustine comes closer than any earlier philosopher to positing will as a faculty of choice that is reducible neither to reason nor to non-rational desire. ..
Like memory and thought, will is a constitutive element of the mind (see 6.2 The Human Mind as an Image of God). It is closely related to love and, accordingly, the locus of moral evaluation. We act well or badly if and only if our actions spring from a good or evil will, which is equivalent to saying that they are motivated by right (i.e., God-directed) or perverse (i.e., self-directed) love (De civitate dei 14.7).”
FirstOrderVolition“Augustine admits both first-order and second-order volitions, the latter being acts of the liberum voluntatis arbitrium, the ability to choose between conflicting first-order volitions (Stump 2001; Horn 1996; den Bok 1994). Like desires, first-order volitions are intentional or object-directed and operate on all levels of the soul.”is subkind of Will; mediates between Love and Object
SecondOrderVolitionSecond-order volition “acts of the liberum voluntatis arbitrium, the ability to choose between conflicting first-order volitions”. is subkind of Will; chooses between conflicting FirstOrderVolitions
AssentToImpulse“The mechanics of the will in Augustine’s moral psychology is strongly indebted to the Stoic theory of assent [to impulse], which it however modifies in at least one respect. As in Stoicism, the will to act is triggered by an impression generated by an external object (visum). To this the mind responds with an appetitive motion that urges us to pursue or to avoid the object (e.g., delight or fear). But only when we give our inner consent to this impulse or withhold it, does a will emerge that, circumstances permitting, results in a corresponding action. The will is the proper locus of our moral responsibility because it is neither in our power whether an object presents itself to our senses or intellect nor whether we take delight in it (De libero arbitrio 3.74; Ad Simplicianum 1.2.21), and our attempts to act externally may succeed or fail for reasons beyond our control. The only element that is in our power is our will or inner consent [to impulse], for which we are therefore fully responsible. Thus, a person who has consented to adultery is guilty even if his attempt actually to commit it is unsuccessful, and a victim of rape who does not consent to the deed keeps her will free of sin even if she feels physical pleasure (De civitate dei 1.16–28). Augustine therefore defines sin as “the will to keep or pursue something unjustly” (De duabus animabus 15). The second stage in the above structure, the involuntary appetitive motion of the soul, is reminiscent of the Stoic “first motions”, but it also corresponds to the “impulse”, which in Stoicism does not precede consent but follows it and immediately results in action. Temptations of this kind are, in Augustine, not personal sins but due to original sin, and they haunt even the saints. Our will must be freed by divine grace to resist them (Contra Iulianum 6.70)”characterizes Will
GodChristian God provide grace to the choosen ones (predestination).provides Grace
Grace“Divine grace is necessarry for restoring the freedom of the will for the fallen human: “By c. 400 CE, Augustine had come to the conclusion that our ability to make choices was seriously impaired by the fallen condition of humankind and that it made little sense to talk about free will without reference to grace. The optimistic-sounding claim in the first book of De libero arbitrio (1.25–26; 29) that it is in our power to be good as soon as we choose to be good because ‘nothing is as completely in our will as will itself’ was probably never the whole story; already in book 3 of the same work Augustine says that the cognitive and motivational deficiencies caused by Adam’s sin […] seriously compromise our natural ability to choose the good […], he radicalizes this to the idea that original sin makes us unable to completely subdue our sinful volitions as long as we live, so that we live in a permanent state of “akrasia” or weakness of will (De natura et gratia 61–67; De civitate dei 19.4; De nuptiis et concupiscentia 1.35). But he never questions the principle that we have been created with the natural ability to freely and voluntarily choose the good, nor does he ever deny the applicability of the cogito argument to the will (cf. De civitate dei 5.10) or doubt that our volitions are imputable to us. What grace does is to restore our natural freedom; it does not compel us to act against our will.”is necessary for freedom of the Will
ObjectThe Object of Love

Sources

  • All citations from: Mendelson, Michael, “Saint Augustine“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

First published: 16/01/2020
Updated: Added God and predestination 01/05/2020