[3.3.5] Ontological Structure of Ibn Sina’s Logic

Ibn Sina (Avicenna, 980-1037 AD) was the most crucial logician in the Arabic tradition. He synthesized, re-framed and extended the problems and solutions inherited from Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition, e.g.:

  • enriched Aristotelian term logic [3.3.9] with the systematical and detailed consideration of modality and reading (see Categorical Propositions),
  • introduced propositional logic different from the Stoic one [3.5.4] (see Hypothetical Propositions).

Here is a very high level OntoUML representation of Avicenna’s logic:

Avicenna on logic
ClassDescriptionRelations
PropositionProposition (qaḍiyya) according to Avicenna can be (1) categoricals, and (2) hypotheticals. 
Categorical
Proposition
Categorical (ḥamliyyāt) propositions are subject (mawḍūʿ)-predicate (maḥmūl) propositions expressing a relation (nisba) or judgment (ḥukm) between terms.”
E.g.: “Avicenna is man.”
“All man are mortal.”
is Proposition
Hypothetical
Proposition
Hypotheticals (šarṭiyyāt) comprise two main sub-types, depending on whether the component sentences are in connection (ittiṣāl) or in conflict (ʿinād)… The resulting propositional types are conditionals (muttaṣilāt) and disjunctions (munfaṣilāt)…”is Proposition
Conditional
Proposition
The Conditional proposition is formulating a relation of following (ittibāʿ) between and two propositions, an antecedent (muqaddam) and a consequent (tālin).
E.g.If [the sun rises], then [it is day].”
is Hypothetical Proposition
Disjunctive
Proposition
The Disjunctive Proposition expresses a conflict in terms of a disjunction of propositions (or parts, ağzāʾ).
E.g.Either [this number is even] or [<this number> is odd].”
is Hypothetical Proposition
AntecedentAntecedent is a possible role of a Categorical Proposition in a Conditional Proposition, where designates a condition.
E.g.[the sun rises]”
is shared part of Conditional proposition; is Categorical Proposition
ConsequentConsequent is a possible role of a Categorical Proposition in a Conditional Proposition, where designates a consequence of the Antecedent.
E.g.[it is day].”
is shared part of Conditional proposition; is Categorical Proposition
FollowingThe relation of following between antecedent and consequent in conditional propositions.Relates Antecedent with Consequent
ModalityModality: every categorical proposition is modalized, either implicitly or explicitly. The modality may be either temporal […], alethic […], or a combination of both.”Characterizes Categorical Proposition
Temporal
Modality
Temporal Modality can be e.g.: sometime, always, never etc.inherits from Modality
Alethic
Modality
Alethic Modality can be e.g.: necessarily, possibly, impossibly etc. inherits from Modality
Readingevery categorical proposition is subject to an additional reading, depending on whether the proposition is taken to express a relation between the predicate and what is picked out by the subject:”
(a) referential/substantial (ḏātī): “as long as what is picked out by the subject exists (mā dāma mawğūd aḏ-ḏāt) or
(b) descriptional (waṣfī): “as long as it is qualified—or ‘described’ (mā dāma mawṣūf)—by the subject. This move amounts to adding a temporal parameter that identifies”
is related to Categorical Proposition
SyllogismSillogism is an inference with two ore more premises, and having as conclusion a proposition. the terms of which are just those two terms not shared by the premises.
E.g. P1: “All man are mortal.” P2: “Avicenna is man,” C: “Avicenna is mortal.”
relates 2 or more premises and 1 conclusion;
Connective
Syllogism
Connective syllogisms are divided into two main types: (1) categorical (ḥamlī) and (2) hypothetical (šarṭī) syllogisms.” is Syllogism
Repetitive
Syllogism
“The repetitive (istiṯnāʾī) syllogistic covers inference patterns such as modus ponens and modus tollens (in their conditional and disjunctive variants)…
Repetitive syllogisms consist of (i) a hypothetical premise (conditional or disjunctive) containing the conclusion or its negation as one of its parts, and (ii) another premise which asserts or denies (and thereby “repeats”) part of the hypothetical premise.”
is Syllogism
ReductioAd
Absurdum
“A reductio [ad absurdum] is a compound syllogism (qiyās murakkab)—i.e., a concatenation of syllogisms—consisting of a connective hypothetical syllogism and of a repetitive syllogism. Both categorical and hypothetical propositions may be proved by reductio.”is Syllogism
Categorical
Syllogism
Categorical syllogisms are those whose premises and conclusions are all and only categorical propositions.”is Connective Syllogism
Hypothetical
Syllogism
“The hypothetical syllogistic investigates arguments in which at least one of the premises is a hypothetical proposition (of type (i), namely one whose parts are themselves categoricals. Purely hypothetical syllogisms are those in which the combination of the premises involve only hypotheticals (conditional-conditional; conditional-disjunction; disjunction-disjunction). Mixed hypothetical syllogisms are those in which the combination of the premises involves a hypothetical (conditional or disjunction) and a categorical.”is Connective Syllogism
MoodMoods are formalized templates of valid (productive) syllogismsCharacterizes syllogism

Sources

  • All citations from:  Strobino, Riccardo, “Ibn Sina’s Logic”The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

First published: 29/08/2019
Updated: 6/3/2021 added Following

[2.7.3] Boethius on Universals

Boethius (477-525 AD), in his second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge (see [2.5]) presented a theory of universals characterized by moderate realism, responding to Porphyry’s questions:

Porphyry’s questionsUniversals according to Boethius
(a) whether genera and species [universals] are real or are situated in bare thoughts aloneare in the mind
(b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporealsare incorporeals
(c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with themare in connection with the sensibles

Boethius model of universals is in the following OntoUML diagram:

Boethius on universals
Class/PackageDescriptionRelations
MindThe “separation in thought of those things that cannot be separated in reality is the process of abstraction. In general, by means of the process of abstraction, our mind (in particular, the faculty of our mind Aristotle calls active intellect (nous poietikos, in Greek, intellectus agens, in Latin) is able to form universal representations of particular objects by disregarding what distinguishes them, and conceiving of them only in terms of those of their features in respect of which they do not differ from one another.” (Klima 2017)
Universalsuniversals are regarded as universal mental representations existing in the mind […]. On this Aristotelian conception, universals need not be thought of as somehow sharing their being with all their distinct particulars, for their being simply consists in their being thought of, or rather, the particulars’ being thought of in a universal manner. This is what Boethius expresses by saying in his final replies to Porphyry’s questions the following:
‘… genera and species subsist in one way, but are understood in an another. They are incorporeal, but subsist in sensibles [individuals], joined to sensibles [individuals]. They are understood, however, as subsisting by themselves, and as not having their being in others.” (Klima 2017)
Genus“The genus is the part of the real definition that answers the broad question What is it? What is man? Man is an animal.” (see also [2.5])(Spade 2009)in the (part of the) Mind; is in a recursive association with itself; each level splits the superior level in 2 or more, based on the attributes marked in Difference
Species“Man is a most specific species. Below man there are only individual men, not yet lower species. What this means, of course, is that the differences among individual men are not essential differences but accidental ones. If they were essential differences, then we would have lower species after all.” (see also [2.5]) (Spade 2009)subkind of Genus; subsists in, joined to Individual
Individual“Below man [as species] there are only individual men, not yet lower species. What this means, of course, is that the differences among individual men are not essential differences but accidental ones.” (see also [2.5]) (Spade 2009)

Related posts in theory of Universals: [1.2.2], [1.3.1], [1.3.2], [2.5], [2.7.3], [4.3.1], [4.3.2], [4.4.1][4.5.2], [4.9.8]

Sources

  • Klima, Gyula, “The Medieval Problem of Universals”The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
  • Spade, Paul Vincent, “History of the Problem of Universals in the Middle Ages”, Indiana University 2009

First published: 04/06/2020