[4.17.4] John Buridan on the Supposition of Categorematic and Syncategorematic Term

John Buridan (Jean Buridan 1301-1358) in Summulae de Dialectica writes about types of terms, signification, and supposition:

  • Propositions (sentences) are made up of terms.
  • Terms in a proposition refer to others (suppositum or supposita); this relation is called supposition. The supposition of a term always occurs in a propositional context and can be entirely different from its signification (see [4.0.1][4.17.2][4.17.3]).
  • Spoken and written terms and concepts can be categorematic and syncategorematic.  The former represents something in themselves (e.g., man, Aristotle, number), the latter represents something connected with other concepts (e.g. non in nonhuman).
  • Syncategorematic terms signify immediately syncategorematiconcepts, while categorematic terms signify immediatley categorematiconcepts and ultimately objects.
  • Categorematic terms can participate in material and personal supposition (see [4.0.2]), while syncategorematic terms can participate only in material supposition.

The following OntoUML diagram pictures the main classes of the types of terms, signification and supposition.

Buridan on terms, signification, supposition
ClassDescriptionRelations
Propositionproposition or sentence is made up of terms.
TermA mental, spoken, or written term.
“It should, therefore, be realized that three kinds of expressions and three kinds of terms can be distinguished, as is touched upon at the beginning of On Interpretation: namely, mental, spoken, and written” (Buridan)
shared part of Proposition
Supposition“What sort of relation is supposition? Well, the first thing we can say about it is that supposition is a semantic relation. To a first (but pretty good) approximation, supposition in this first part of the theory is what nowadays we call ‘reference.’ It is the relation between the terms used in a proposition and the things those terms are used to talk about in that proposition. […] supposition occurs only in a propositional context. And this is the first main difference between supposition and signification, which can occur outside a propositional context according to almost any author.
The second main difference is this: We do not always in practice use terms in propositions to talk about what those terms signify. We use them in a variety of other ways too. Hence supposition also differs from signification insofar as a term may signify one thing, but supposit on a given occasion for something entirely different.” (Spade)
relates Terms
Spoken_WrittenTermSpoken or written terms are utterances or inscriptions.
“What a [spoken or written] term immediately signifies is the mental act on account of which we recognize the term as a significative utterance or inscription, as opposed to some articulate sound or discernible scribble that makes no sense to us at all. Thus, those utterances that do have signifi cation are meaningful precisely because they are associated with some act of understanding, or, in late scholastic terminology, because they are subordinated to some concept of the human mind, whatever such a concept is, namely, whether it is some spiritual modification of an immaterial mind or just a firing pattern of neurons in the brain.” (Klima)
subkind of Term
SyncategorematicTermSyncategorematic terms may signify only the syncategorematic concept to which they are subordinated. Because the function of such a concept (for example, the concept of negation, conjunction, and similar logical connectives) is not to conceive of anything, but merely to modify the representative function of other concepts, the purely syncategorematic term subordinated to it will not signify anything else. […]
For example, the term-negation ‘non’ in the term ‘nonhuman’ does not signify anything in extramental reality, for there is no such a thing as a negation in re existing on a par with humans, beasts, plants, and rocks. However, this does not mean that this word does not signify at all. For even if it does not signify something, it does signify somehow: even if it does not signify a negation in re, it does signify negatively, namely, by negating the significata of the categorematic term with which it is construed, so that the resulting complex term supposits in a proposition for what is not signified by the negated categorematic term. […]
syncategorematic terms can have material supposition (thus the term ‘non’ in ‘Non est negatio’ can be taken to stand materiallyfor its immediate signifi cata, the token concepts of negation in individual human minds or itself and other tokens of the same type).”
(Klima)
subkind of Spoken_WrittenTerm; immediately signifies SyncategorematicConcept
CategorematicTerm“A categorematic term, therefore, is said to signify the concept to which it is subordinated immediately, but it is imposed to signify ultimately the object (or objects) conceived by this concept, in the manner that it is (or they are) conceived by means of this concept […]
Obviously, in accordance with these descriptions, only categorematic terms can have personal supposition (since only they have ultimate signifi cata), but both categorematic and syncategorematic terms can have material supposition“. (Klima)
subkind of Spoken_WrittenTerm; immediately signifies CategorematicConcept; ultimately signifies Object
MixedTerm“To be sure, there are also some “mixed” terms, which, for example primarily signify some syncategorematic act of the mind, but also connote, on account of the connotation of the concept they are subordinated to, something ad extra, such as the verbal copula, which primarily signifies the mental act of composition (the joining of subject and predicate in a proposition), but also connotes some time relative to the present time of the speaker.” (Klima)mixes CategorematicTerm and SyncategorematicTerm
MaterialSupposition; PersonalSupposition“We have also seen that in various propositional contexts the same term may not stand for its ultimatesignificata at all, but either for its immediate significata (the token concepts it is subordinated to) or for itself and other token terms of the same kind. In all such cases, when a term does not stand for its ultimate significata, Buridan says that it is taken nonsignificatively, that is, materially, or in material supposition. By contrast, when a categorematic term stands for its ultimate significata, it is taken significatively, or in personal supposition.” (Klima)
Material supposition is a subkind of supposition. For conventional (written and spoken) languages Buridan accepts Ockham’s view on supposition. For more details please check [4.0.2].
subkind of Supposition; relates CategorematicTerms
MaterialSupposition forSyncatogramaticTermsSyncategorematic terms can have just material suppositionsubkind of Supposition
ConceptA concept is a term in mental language an act of understanding. 
“Buridan makes it quite clear that in his view a concept cannot vary its semantic features, which means that there is no ambiguity in mental language. The same concept always represents the same things in the same way, so there is not even a variation of supposition in mental language in the way there is in spoken or written languages” (Klima)
subkind of Term
SyncategorematicConcept“Concepts, being representative acts of the mind, are naturally classified in terms of their representative function, which in turn is specified in terms of what and how these concepts represent or naturally signify. However, some concepts represent something only in connection with other concepts, whereas others represent something in themselves. The former are called syncategorematic, whereas the latter are called categorematic concepts.” (Klima)subkind of Concept
CategorematicConcept“Concepts, being representative acts of the mind, are naturally classified in terms of their representative function, which in turn is specifi ed in terms of what and how these concepts represent or naturally signify. However, some concepts represent something only in connection with other concepts, whereas others represent something in themselves. The former are called syncategorematic, whereas the latter are called categorematic concepts.” (Klima)subkind of Concept; signifies Object
ObjectAn object, a thing or state of affairs in the external (or internal) world.

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First published: 3/10/2021 first use of VisualParadigm OntoUML plugin

[4.17.3] John Buridan on the Theory of Supposition (Reference)

John Buridan (Jean Buridan 1301-1358) in Summulae de Dialectica writes about supposition occurring in conventional (spoken and written) languages and mental language:

  • Propositions (sentences) are made up of terms.
  • Terms in a proposition refer to other terms – the suppositum (or supposita); this relation is called supposition. The supposition of a term always occurs in a propositional context and can be entirely different from its signification (see [4.0.1]).
  • Written and spoken terms signify Concepts conventionally; Concepts signify Objects naturally.
  • Buridan (in contrast to Ockham, see [4.0.2]) differentiated the mechanism of supposition for the different layers of language: for conventional (spoken and written) language supposition has various subkinds, like improper, proper, material, simple, personal. On the other hand, for the mental language we have only personal supposition, because “concepts signify just what is conceived by them— that is, just what they are thoughts of—and since in general it is only in personal supposition that terms supposit for what they signify” (Spade)

The following OntoUML diagram depicts Buridan’s theory of supposition (reference):

Buridan on supposition (reference)
ClassDescriptionRelations
Propositionproposition or sentence is made up of terms.
TermA mental, spoken, or written term.shared part of proposition; refers to Suppositum
SuppositumSuppositum is “whatever a term supposits for.”role of Term
Supposition“What sort of relation is supposition? Well, the first thing we can say about it is that supposition is a semantic relation. To a first (but pretty good) approximation, supposition in this first part of the theory is what nowadays we call ‘reference.’ It is the relation between the terms used in a proposition and the things those terms are used to talk about in that proposition. […] supposition occurs only in a propositional context. And this is the first main difference between supposition and signification, which can occur outside a propositional context according to almost any author.
The second main difference is this: We do not always in practice use terms in propositions to talk about what those terms signify. We use them in a variety of other ways too. Hence supposition also differs from signification insofar as a term may signify one thing, but supposit on a given occasion for something entirely different.” (Spade)
relates Term with Suppositum
Spoken_WrittenTermSpoken or written terms are utterances or inscriptions.subkind of Term refers to Spoken_WrittenSuppositum; signifies conventionally Concept
Spoken_WrittenSuppositumA spoken or written term in the context of a proposition refers to (supposits) a spoken or written suppositum.role of Spoken_WrittenTerm
SuppositionInConventional LanguageSupposition in conventional language is supposition occuring in spoken or written (conventional) languages.subkind of Supposition; relates Spoken_WrittenTerm with Spoken_WrittenSuppositum
ImproperSupposition“Improper supposition […] is the kind of supposition or reference a term has when it is used figuratively and not literally. Now a detailed semantics of metaphor was just as much beyond the reach of mediaeval authors as it is beyond our reach today. So we should not be surprised to find that the theory of improper supposition is not worked out very fully.” (Spade)subkind of SuppositionIsnConventionalLanguage
ProperSuppositonproper supposition occurs when a term supposits for what it properly signifies” (Spade)subkind of SuppositionInConventionalLanguage
MaterialSupposition; SimpleSupposition; PersonalSuppositionMaterialSupposition; SimpleSupposition; PersonalSupposition are subkinds of supposition. For conventional (written and spoken) languages Buridan accepts Ockham’s view on supposition. For more details please check [4.0.2]. subkinds of ProperSuppositon
ConceptA concept is a term in mental language an act of understanding. 
“Buridan makes it quite clear that in his view a concept cannot vary its semantic features, which means that there is no ambiguity in mental language. The same concept always represents the same things in the same way, so there is not even a variation of supposition in mental language in the way there is in spoken or written languages” (Klima)
subkind of Term; refers to MentalSuppositum; signifies naturally Object
MentalSuppositumA concept in the context of a (mental) proposition refers to (supposits) a mental suppositum.role of Concept
MentalPersonalSuppositionBuridan makes it quite clear that in his view a concept cannot vary its semantic features, which means that there is no ambiguity in mental language. The same concept always represents the same things in the same way, so there is not even a variation of supposition in mental language in the way there is in spoken or written languages:
We should know, therefore, that (as it seems to me), material material supposition occurs only where signifi cative utterances are concerned. For no mental term in a mental proposition supposits materially, but rather always personally, for we do not use mental terms by convention [ad placitum] as we do with utterances and written marks. This is because the same mental expression never has diverse signifi cations, or acceptations; for the affections of the soul [ passiones animae] are the same for all, just like the things of which they are the likenesses, as is said in bk. 1 of On Interpretation. […]
A concept that represents some object does not signify it by virtue of anything else: to have such a concept active in one’s mind is just to conceive of the object in the way the concept represents it. This understanding of the representative function of a concept, however, immediately renders Ockham’s account problematic. For to have a concept active in one’s mind on this understanding is to conceive of the object represented by the concept, whereas the same concept may represent different objects. Sometimes it may represent its ordinary objects, as the concept of human beings does in the mental counterpart of ‘Man is an animal’. At other times, it may represent itself or a similar concept, as it does in the mental counterpart of ‘Man is a species’. Consequently, it would appear that one might not be sure just what one conceives of, for one may not be sure whether the same concept is to be taken to stand for itself or for its ordinary objects, just as one may not be sure about the supposition of the subject termof the corresponding spoken proposition. But this seems absurd, namely, that having a concept active in one’s mind, one is not sure what one conceives by that concept, given that having the concept active in one’s mind is nothing but conceiving of its object in the way the concept represents it. In his detailed analysis of the problem, Paul Spade put the point in the following way. “Since concepts signify just what is conceived by them— that is, just what they are thoughts of—and since in general it is only in personal supposition that terms supposit for what they signify, it follows that if mental terms may have simple or material supposition, we do not always know what we are asserting in a mental sentence.” (Klima)
subkind of Supposition; relates Concept with MentalSuppositum
ObjectAn object, a thing or state of affairs in the external (or internal) world.

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First published: 20/9/2021 (szülinap edition)