[4.11] Albert the Great on Universals

Albert the Great (Albertus Magnus, 1200?-1280 AD), in his paraphrase of Aristotle’s Organon, took the position that the universal’s mode of being should be analyzed based on its function. It may be considered in itself, or relative to understanding, or as existing in one individual. This way, he concluded, that both the nominalist and realist solutions to Porphyry’s questions are too simplistic.
He harmonized “Plato’s realism in which universals existed as separate forms with Aristotle’s more nominalistic theory of immanent forms”.

Porphyry’s questionsUniversals according to Albert
(a) whether genera and species [universals] are real or are situated in bare thoughts alonethey are real
(b) whether as real they are bodies or incorporealsthey are incorporeals
(c) whether they are separated or in sensibles and have their reality in connection with themthey are separated, but also in sensibles and have their reality in connection with them, based on the point of view of the analysis.

Albert’s model of universals is presented in the following OntoUML diagram:

Albert on universals
ClassDescriptionRelations
UniversalAlbert “defined the term universal as referring to ‘ … that which, although it exists in one, is apt by nature to exist in many.’ Because it is apt to be in many, it is predicable of them. (De praed., tract II, c. 1) He then distinguished three kinds of universals, those that pre-exist the things that exemplify them (universale ante rem), those that exist in individual things (universale in re), and those that exist in the mind when abstracted from individual things (universale post rem). […]
Albert appealed to his three-fold distinction, noting that a universal’s mode of being is differentiated according to which function is being considered. It may be considered in itself, or in respect to understanding, or as existing in one particular or another. Both the nominalist and realist solutions to Porphyry’s problem are thus too simplistic and lack proper distinction. Albert’s distinction thus allowed him to harmonize Plato’s realism in which universals existed as separate forms with Aristotle’s more nominalistic theory of immanent forms.”
Pre-existingUniversalPre-existing universals (universale ante rem): “For universals when considered in themselves (secudum quod in seipso) truly exist and are free from generation, corruption, and change”is role of Universal
UniversalInIndividualUniversals in individal (universale in re): “But when they are considered in particulars (secundum quod est in isto vel in illo) their existence is exterior to as well as beyond the mind, yet existing in things as individuated.”is role of Universal; exclusive part of Individual
UniversalInMindUniversal in mind (universale post rem) ar abstracted from individuals: “If, however, they are taken in reference to the mind (refertur ad intelligentiam) they exist in two modes, depending on whether they are considered with respect to the intellect that is their cause or the intellect that knows them by abstraction.”is role of Universal; shared part of Mind
Minda human mindknows Individual
Individualan individual (or particular)exemplifies Pre-existingUniversal
AnalysisViewpointThe viewpoint form which we consider analize the Universal.
RelativeItself; RelativeIndividual; RelativeUnderstanding“Albert appealed to his three-fold distinction, noting that a universal’s mode of being is differentiated according to which function is being considered. It may be considered in itself, or in respect to understanding, or as existing in one particular or another.”subkinds of AnalysisViewpoint; relates to (in order) Pre-existingUniversal; UniversalInIndividual; UniversalInMind

Related posts in theory of Universals: [1.2.2][1.3.1][1.3.2][2.5][2.7.3][4.3.1][4.3.2][4.4.1][4.5.2], [4.9.8]

Sources

  • All citations from: Führer, Markus, “Albert the Great”The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

First published: 21/1/2021
Updated: 7/3/2021 added AnalysisViewpoint and its subkinds

[4.10.1] St Bonaventure on Creatures as God’s Signs

St Bonaventure (the “Seraphic Doctor”, 1217 – 1274 AD), in the work Commentary on the Sentences of Lombard, writes about the ways how all created things signifies God:

  • God created all things, so the whole universe existentially depends on God.
  • All creatures act in the role of signs which point to God; these signs can be of four types.
  • Based on their properties, all creatures signify God as shadows and vestiges; more than that, rational creatures signify it as images and similitudes.
  • Rational creatures (humans, angels) have the power to look to these signs, which leads them to God. This way rational creatures “have God as their ultimate object, whereas all creatures have God as their Cause”.

Bonaventure’s model of creatures as God’s signs is pictured in the following OntoUML diagram:

Bonaventure on creations as signs of God

ClassRationalCreatureClassDescriptionRelations
GodGod creates the creatures whose existence depends on him.creates Creature; provides divine grace to RationalCreature
Creature“All creatures, from rocks to angels, are signs in the sense of shadows and traces of God, for they all bear a relation of causal dependency upon God as their source; but only rational creatures can have the divine as an object of their activities and, for that reason, can conform themselves to the divine will and become likenesses of God.”
PropertyCreatures can be vestiges or shadows based on properties which point to God.characterizes Creature
Shadow“a creature is called a shadow based on its properties which point to God in some type of causality in an indeterminate way.”role of Creature; is Sign
Vestige“a creature is called a vestige based on properties which point to God as triple cause–efficient, formal, and final cause; for example, the properties: one, true, and good.”role of Creature; is Sign
RationalCreature“[…] only rational creatures can have the divine as an object of their activities and, for that reason, can conform themselves to the divine will and become likenesses of God.”subkind of Creature; observes Sign
RationalPowerRational powercharacterizes RationalCreature; subkind of Property
Image“Bonaventure posits […] higher types of semiosis pertinent solely to rational creatures, which are ‘images’ (imago) pointing to the First Principle through its properly rational powers which have their source and highest object in God”role of RationalCreature; is Sign
Likeness“In addition, Bonaventure posits […] higher types of semiosis pertinent solely to rational creatures, which are […] ‘likenesses’ (similitudo) of God to the extent that they are recipients of divine grace and conform themselves to the divine will.” role of RationalCreature; is Sign
Sign“Bonaventure’s semiotics distinguishes four sorts of signs [wich are shadow, vestige, image, similitude...]
All creatures, from rocks to angels, are signs in the sense of shadows and traces of God, for they all bear a relation of causal dependency upon God as their source; but only rational creatures can have the divine as an object of their activities and, for that reason, can conform themselves to the divine will and become likenesses of God.”
points to God

Sources

  • All citations from: Noone, Tim and R. E. Houser, “Saint Bonaventure“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

First published: 10/12/2020