[6.7.0] Bernardino Telesio on Cosmology

Bernardino Telesio (1509–1588) “belongs to a group of independent philosophers of the late Renaissance who left the universities in order to develop philosophical and scientific ideas beyond the restrictions of the Aristotelian-scholastic tradition. [… ] Telesio’s vision of the genesis of nature is simple to the point of being archaic, yet at the same time astonishingly modern in the sense that he seems to have been one of the very first defenders of a theory of natural evolution without metaphysical or theological presuppositions.”

  • According to Telesio things are characterized by nature
  • Things can be of three subkinds: martter, vacuum and force.
  • Force can be: heat and cold.
  • “The primary activity of warmth [heat] is to move fast and to dilate and rarefy matter, whereas that of cold is to hinder movement and to condense matter.”

The following OntoUML diagram shows Bernardino Telesio’s model on cosmology:

Telesio ontology
ClassDescriptionRelations
Nature
All things act solely according to their own nature, starting from the primary forces of cold and heat. The Epicurean chance is enclosed in Telesio’s Stoic-influenced philosophy of nature (Kessler 1992): everything can produce everything, an idea which was soon to be sharply rejected by Francesco Patrizi da Chierso, one of the most important contemporary readers of Telesio (“Obiectiones”, in the appendix of Telesio’s Varii libelli, p. 467 f.). In order to sustain themselves, these primary forces and all beings which arise through their antagonistic interaction must be able to sense themselves as well as the opposite force, that is, they must sense what is convenient and what is inconvenient or damaging for their survival and well-being. Sensation, therefore, is not the property of embodied souls. Telesio’s philosophy can thus be described as a pansensism in the sense that all beings, animate or inanimate, are said to have the power of sensation.
ThingTelesio’s vision of the genesis of nature is simple to the point of being archaic, yet at the same time astonishingly modern in the sense that he seems to have been one of the very first defenders of a theory of natural evolution without metaphysical or theological presuppositions. According to his De rerum natura, the only things which must be presupposed are passive matter and active force, the latter of which Telesio thought of as twofold, heat and cold.characterizes
Thing
Matterthe only things which must be presupposed are passive matter and active force, the latter of which Telesio thought of as twofold, heat and coldsubkind of Thing
VacuumThe existence of vacuum within space is admitted, but things are said to have a natural
inclination to avoid empty space.
subkind of Thing
Forcethe only things which must be presupposed are passive matter and active force, the latter of which Telesio thought of as twofold, heat and cold.subkind of Thing
Heatthe only things which must be presupposed are passive matter and active force, the latter of which Telesio thought of as twofold, heat and cold.subkind of Force
Coldthe only things which must be presupposed are passive matter and active force, the latter of which Telesio thought of as twofold, heat and cold.subkind of Force
Move&DilateThe primary activity of warmth is to move fast and to dilate and rarefy matter, whereas that of cold is to hinder movement and to condense matter. Things differ according to the amount of heat or cold they possess (and therefore according to their density and derivative qualities such as velocity and colour). The quantity of matter is not changed through the action of these forces upon it. The role of heat, cold and matter as ‘natural principles’ had been highlighted before by Girolamo Fracastoro in the first version of the de natura.characterizes Heat
Hinter& CondenseThe primary activity of warmth is to move fast and to dilate and rarefy matter, whereas that of cold is to hinder movement and to condense matter. characterizes
Cold

Sources

  • Boenke, Michaela, “Bernardino Telesio“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

First published: 05/11/2022

[6.6.2] Pierro Pomonazzi on Fate

Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525) in 1520, completed De fato, de libero arbitrio, et de praedestinatione (On Fate, Free Will, and Predestination), where he stated, that:

  • God is the efficient cause of the world
  • Celestial and sublunary bodies depend on God
  • Humans are sublunary bodies and are characterized by a lack of free will.

The following OntoUML diagram shows Pomponazzi’s model on the absence of free will:

Pomonazzi on free will
CLASSDESCRIPTIONDESCRIPTION
GodGod is the efficient cause of the world
EfficientCauseGod is the efficient cause of the world role of God
CelestialBodyOn Fate, Pomponazzi argued that God, as the efficient cause of the world, acts on the sublunary world using the celestial bodies.subkind of Body
SublunaryBody“On Fate, Pomponazzi argued that God, as the efficient cause of the world, acts on the sublunary [bodies] world using the celestial bodies. God is the principal cause, and the celestial bodies are the instrumental cause of accidental effects in the celestial bodies. world, which Alexander and Thomas Aquinas viewed as contingent and without a cause (1.7.II/15). The celestial bodies’ motion, contiguous to the lower world, drives and determines alterations on earth. Therefore, accidental effects, ultimately resulting from God acting as an efficient cause, occur by necessity (1.7.II/16). Pomponazzi maintained that they are mistakenly called contingent as a result of human ignorance of causes and future events but not from any irregularity in matter, natural powers, or celestial influences. Rather, all accidental effects and what appears to result from luck or chance can be traced back to fixed causes
(1.7.II/23–26).”
subkind of Body
BodyA sublunary or celestial body. subkind of Human
HumanA human person
LackOfFreeWillLack of free will:
“Pomponazzi maintained that human will functions just like the rest of nature. It depends on an eternal, external mover, namely God’s will and the celestial motions (1.9.2.10).
Just as for other natural beings, if there is a potentiality and no impediment, by necessity the potentiality will be realized. Thus, the human will reacts to external factors according to its powers and the absence of impediments (1.9.2.12). Consequently, the human will depends on higher, universal causes. The apparent ability of humans to deliberate between choices using reason, however, is an illusion because every actor is in fact directed toward one of the choices by external causes (1.9.3.2–4).
The rejection of the existence of free will presented difficult ramifications for Christian ethics and theology, which depend on the freedom to choose a virtuous life. In resolving these difficulties, Pomponazzi chose fate over freedom because he thought that it better preserved God’s complete power and providence. If God had granted freedom to humans, the lack, or extreme rarity, of truly virtuous humans on earth demonstrates the absence of a truly providential plan in which humans’ freedom to choose a completely moral good life is realized. Similarly, if humans have the ability of free choice, God must not know these future decisions and humans are thereby limited with respect to his knowledge and power. As a consequence, Pomponazzi opted for fate and determinism, rejecting what he considered to be a denial of God’s providence, omnipotence, and omniscience. The world’s order and the cosmic laws that govern the eternal motions of the universe include the existence of good and evil as part of the necessary cycles of change.”
characterizes human

Sources

  • Martin, Craig, “Pietro Pomponazzi“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

First published: 05/11/2022