Philosophy of language

[2.2.2] Stoic Philosophy of Language

A. L. Komáromi9 Comments

“In philosophy of language, their (stoics) most noted innovation was their theory of ‘sayables’ or lekta. The Stoics distinguish between the signification, the signifier and the name-bearer. Two of these are bodies: the signifier which is the utterance and the name-bearer which is what gets signified. The signification, however, is an incorporeal thing called a lekton, or ‘sayable,’ and it, and neither of the other two, is what is true or false (Sextus Empiricus 160-210 AD). They define a sayable as “that which subsists in accordance with a rational impression.” Rational impressions are those alterations of the commanding faculty or rational mind whose content can be exhibited in language. Presumably ‘graphei Sôkratês’ and ‘Socrates writes’ exhibit the contents of one and the same rational impression in different languages.”

In this diagram I used OntoUML notation to present the main concepts of Stoic philosophy of language:

Stoic philosophy of language
ClassDescriptionRelations
Body “Only bodies (σώματα, sômata) have being, or exist. Slogan: to exist is to have causal powers. Plato in the Sophist: ‘Now, I say that what has some power to make something else into something, or to suffer the slightest, even once, this has real being. For I define being as nothing but power (δύναμις).’ The Stoic conception of existence is thus dynamic. Matter as such is passive, but bodies are not, since they are also infused by logos, which is active… only bodies can act or be acted upon” (Baltzly)
NameBearerObject “the name-bearer which is what gets signified” – the object (to tychanon). (Baltzly)
E.g: the black cat. 		role of Body
Utterance“the signifier … is the utterance” – the sound what is said in a given language. (Baltzly)
E.g: the sounds when we say: “The cat is black”. 		subkind of Body; signifies NameBearerObject; means Sayable
IncorporealIncorporeals are: “These do not exist, but subsist (ὑφεστάναι, hyphestanai); yet they are real (ὑπάρχειν, hyparchein). We can think of them as conditions ‘without which the interaction of bodies in the world would neither be analysable nor intelligible” (Baltzly)
Sayable They define a sayable as “that which subsists in accordance with a cognitive (rational) impression.”  
“The signification.. is an incorporeal thing called a lekton, or ‘sayable,’ and it, and neither of the other two, is what is true or false” (Baltzly)- the meaning.
E.g: the claim regarding the color of a specific animal 		is Incorporeal; creates CognitivePresentation
CognitivePresentation“Cognitive (rational) impressions [cognitive presentations] are those alterations of the commanding faculty or rational mind whose content can be exhibited in language.” (Baltzly)
AssertibleAssertibles (axiômata) are sayables having a truth value: at any one time they are either true or false. So truth is temporal and assertibles may change their truth-value. They can never be true and false at the same time (law of non-contradiction) and they must be at least true or false (law of excluded middle). (Bobzien)subkind of Sayable
TruthValueTruth value of an Assertible might change over time, so each value is valid from the start time to end time.characterizes Assertible

NOTE: in this diagram I used OntoUML notation.
For better understanding please check also the post about the [2.2.1] Stoic Sage’s Mind and [2.2.5] Stoic Ontology, Genus, Categories.

Sources

  • Baltzly, Dirk, “Stoicism“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
  • Bobzien, Susanne, “Ancient Logic“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

First published: 9/3/2019
Updated: 15/1/2022 addedAssertible, TruthValue

[1.3.3] Aristotle About the Language in De Interpretatione

A. L. Komáromi3 Comments

“The philosophical context in which Aristotle addresses these issues is provided by his predecessors, most importantly by Plato, and thus the first order of business is to look at Plato’s Cratylus on meaning and reference.
The Cratylus is a sustained attack on the theories of meaning that were currently in vogue. Two theories are canvassed there and shown to be inadequate. These theories, moreover, would appear to exhaust the possibilities: either words are conventional signs and meanings are assigned by human beings and can be changed at the whim of the language user(s), or words are natural signs. Naturalism is shown to be required in order to give an adequate account of truth; conventionalism, however, is shown to provide a more satisfactory account of the way in which the words of a natural language acquire, maintain, and change their meanings.

Aristotle’s (384-322 BC) language model in De Interpretatione
ClassDescriptionRelations
NameBearerObject“the object in the world (pragma) that is the referent of the name (word)”
MentalState“the name-bearing mental state (pathema)” refers to NameBearerObject
Meaning“The meaning is the intentional content of the psychological state for which the word stands…” component of MentalState
Convention“The relation between written and spoken words is conventional, as is the relation between spoken words and the mental states that are the vehicles of meaning; different languages correlate different sounds with the same intentional content and the same sound with different contents.” mediates between MentalState and SpokenWord; WrittenWord
SpokenWordThe spoken form of a wordsubkind of Word
WrittenWordThe written form of a word subkind of Word
WordA word in a given languagein material relation with Word

In the De Interpretatione, Aristotle chooses to negotiate a compromise between the two rejected alternatives. The relation between written and spoken words is conventional, as is the relation between spoken words and the mental states that are the vehicles of meaning; different languages correlate different sounds with the same intentional content and the same sound with different contents. Notwithstanding, the relation between the mental state and the object it represents is natural – the same for all humans – and reference is secured by resemblance.”

For better understanding please check the post [1.2.3] about Plato’s Cratylus.

The souce of all citations: Deborah K. W. Modrak, Aristotle’s Theory of Language and Meaning, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 4.

First published: 20/3/2019
Updated: 7/12/2021 minor changes