[6.7.1] Bernardino Telesio on Psychology

Bernardino Telesio (1509–1588) “With regard to psychology, Telesio took a materialist standpoint. According to his general rejection of the metaphysical (and therefore inappropriate) principles of matter and form, he rejected Aristotle’s definition of the soul as forma corporis, i.e. as form and entelechy of an organic body (Aristotle, De anima II,1).
According to Telesio, the soul is a separate being, but not in the sense of the Platonists, who define it as an immortal essence acting as the governor and mover of the body during its embodied life. Telesio held the soul to be a specific part of the body, defining it as the spiritus coursing through the nervous system and having its main seat in the brain. The spiritus which overtakes the role of the anima of the philosophical tradition is produced by the white ‘semen’. Telesio calls it the spiritus e semine eductus” So,

  • Human is a subkind of thing
  • Spirit is a component of human
  • The brain is a component spirit
  • Sense perception depends on the brain, it can take the form of pleasure and pain.

The following OntoUML diagram shows Bernardino Telesio’s model psychology:

Telesio on psychology
ClassDescription Relations
Thing“Telesio’s vision of the genesis of nature is simple to the point of being archaic, yet at the same time astonishingly modern in the sense that he seems to have been one of the very first defenders of a theory of natural evolution without metaphysical or theological presuppositions. According to his De rerum natura, the only things which must be presupposed are passive matter and active force, the latter of which Telesio thought of as twofold, heat and cold.”
Human“And just as there is no metaphysical difference between living and non-living bodies, there also does not exist a qualitative difference between animals and humans—in both, it is the same spirit which coordinates the functions and operations of the different bodily parts.” subkind of Thing
Spirit“With regard to psychology, Telesio took a materialist standpoint. According to his general rejection of the metaphysical (and therefore inappropriate) principles of matter and form, he rejected Aristotle’s definition of the soul as forma corporis, i.e. as form and entelechy of an organic body (Aristotle, De anima II,1).
According to Telesio, the soul [ie spirit] is a separate being, but not in the sense of the Platonists, who define it as an immortal essence acting as the governor and mover of the body during its embodied life. Telesio held the soul to be a specific part of the body, defining it as the spiritus coursing through the nervous system and having its main seat in the brain. The spirits [spirit] which overtakes the role of the anima of the philosophical tradition is produced by the white ‘semen’. Telesio calls it the spiritus e semine eductus
“This [separate substance] will therefore be the spiritus, which took its origin from the semen, as we will explain elsewhere (and it is to be found in all things made from semen, namely those which are white and bloodless, with the exception of the bones and similar things); and only the spirit is what perceives in the animal, and moves sometimes with the whole body, sometimes with single parts thereof, and solely governs the whole animal. That is to say, it performs those actions which, according to the concurring opinion of all, are typical of the soul.” (Vol. II, p. 208).”
componentOf Human
Brain“Telesio combined the medical theory of spirit with a basically Stoic notion, that of the hegemonikon, according to which the spirit in the brain is responsible for all the states and operations traditionally ascribed to the tripartite soul: “the animal … is governed by one substance residing in the brain” (Quod animal universum ch. XXV; Var. lib. p. 254). Whereas in Quod animal universum he went on to explain the affects in terms of physiology, in De rerum natura he added a theory of sense perception and a theory of knowledge on physical grounds.”componentOf Spirit
SensePerception Sense perception: ‘In his opinion, to speak of sense organs is inappropriate, as the so-called sense organs are nothing else than “parts of the body which are either more subtle or soft than others, or perforated and open. One should not believe in the slightest that they are made thus in order to offer some capacity or support of perceiving to the sensitive soul (which seems to be the duty of organs), but in order to provide an easy and open entry to the forces of external things and to those things themselves.”
[…]
As the sense of touch provides the most narrow contact between outer object and sensing spirit, it assumes the role of the primary sense, which was traditionally identified with the sense of vision (DRN book VII, ch. IX, vol. III, p. 34.)
The informatio theory being rejected, Telesio comes close to a neuronal explanation of sense perception, which is a mechanical process arising from the transfer of tactile impressions through the nerves to the brain.”
historicalDependence on Brain
Pleasure; Pain “It is the spirit residing in the brain which experiences nervous dilatations and contractions, and which judges these sensations according to the basic scheme of pleasure and pain, giving out corresponding reactions like moving towards something or avoiding contact (DRN book VII ch. II–V). “historicalRole of SensePerception

Sources

  • Boenke, Michaela, “Bernardino Telesio“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

First published: 05/11/2022

[6.6.2] Pierro Pomonazzi on Fate

Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525) in 1520, completed De fato, de libero arbitrio, et de praedestinatione (On Fate, Free Will, and Predestination), where he stated, that:

  • God is the efficient cause of the world
  • Celestial and sublunary bodies depend on God
  • Humans are sublunary bodies and are characterized by a lack of free will.

The following OntoUML diagram shows Pomponazzi’s model on the absence of free will:

Pomonazzi on free will
CLASSDESCRIPTIONDESCRIPTION
GodGod is the efficient cause of the world
EfficientCauseGod is the efficient cause of the world role of God
CelestialBodyOn Fate, Pomponazzi argued that God, as the efficient cause of the world, acts on the sublunary world using the celestial bodies.subkind of Body
SublunaryBody“On Fate, Pomponazzi argued that God, as the efficient cause of the world, acts on the sublunary [bodies] world using the celestial bodies. God is the principal cause, and the celestial bodies are the instrumental cause of accidental effects in the celestial bodies. world, which Alexander and Thomas Aquinas viewed as contingent and without a cause (1.7.II/15). The celestial bodies’ motion, contiguous to the lower world, drives and determines alterations on earth. Therefore, accidental effects, ultimately resulting from God acting as an efficient cause, occur by necessity (1.7.II/16). Pomponazzi maintained that they are mistakenly called contingent as a result of human ignorance of causes and future events but not from any irregularity in matter, natural powers, or celestial influences. Rather, all accidental effects and what appears to result from luck or chance can be traced back to fixed causes
(1.7.II/23–26).”
subkind of Body
BodyA sublunary or celestial body. subkind of Human
HumanA human person
LackOfFreeWillLack of free will:
“Pomponazzi maintained that human will functions just like the rest of nature. It depends on an eternal, external mover, namely God’s will and the celestial motions (1.9.2.10).
Just as for other natural beings, if there is a potentiality and no impediment, by necessity the potentiality will be realized. Thus, the human will reacts to external factors according to its powers and the absence of impediments (1.9.2.12). Consequently, the human will depends on higher, universal causes. The apparent ability of humans to deliberate between choices using reason, however, is an illusion because every actor is in fact directed toward one of the choices by external causes (1.9.3.2–4).
The rejection of the existence of free will presented difficult ramifications for Christian ethics and theology, which depend on the freedom to choose a virtuous life. In resolving these difficulties, Pomponazzi chose fate over freedom because he thought that it better preserved God’s complete power and providence. If God had granted freedom to humans, the lack, or extreme rarity, of truly virtuous humans on earth demonstrates the absence of a truly providential plan in which humans’ freedom to choose a completely moral good life is realized. Similarly, if humans have the ability of free choice, God must not know these future decisions and humans are thereby limited with respect to his knowledge and power. As a consequence, Pomponazzi opted for fate and determinism, rejecting what he considered to be a denial of God’s providence, omnipotence, and omniscience. The world’s order and the cosmic laws that govern the eternal motions of the universe include the existence of good and evil as part of the necessary cycles of change.”
characterizes human

Sources

  • Martin, Craig, “Pietro Pomponazzi“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

First published: 05/11/2022