[6.6.1] Pierro Pomonazzi on Miracles

Pietro Pomponazzi (1462–1525) in the work On Incantations, “undermines the use of demonic and supernatural explanations for sublunary phenomena”.

  • Particulars can be: natural and preternatural particulars
  • Demons are subkind of preternatural particular
  • Manifest cause; occult power; and indirect cause are behind the causes of wondrous effects
  • Demon’s knowledge is a component demon
  • Human knowledge is subkind of demon’s knowledge and the component of a particular human
  • Sublunary particulars are earthly objects.
  • Natural particulars are celestial and sublunary bodies.

The following OntoUML diagram shows the main structure of Pomponazzi’s model:

Pomonazzi on miracles
ClassDescriptionRelations
ParticularA particular
PreternaturalParticularThe work is presented as a response to the question: How would Aristotelians explain what “seems to be beyond the order of nature” (praeter nature ordinem) or, in other words, what seems preternatural? The category of preternatual, which included diseases and strange, seemingly irregular phenomena, formed the subject matter of numerous early modern philosophical inquiries (see Daston 2000)subkind of Particular
Demon“Yet, Pomponazzi contended that Aristotelians should not use demons to explain these wondrous events. In Pomponazzi’s view even if demons exist, a premise that Aristotle did not admit according to Pomponazzi’s interpretation of Metaphysics Lambda, they would not be able to affect the sublunary world because they would not have adequate knowledge of its particulars.”subkind of Preternatural Particular
HumanKnowledgeHuman knowledge
Demon’sKnowledgeDemons’ knowledge of sublunary particulars must derive either through essences or from sensation and phantasmata (i.e., mental images). Knowledge through essences, however, does not provide knowledge of singulars but only universals and species. Moreover, knowledge from sensation and phantasmata entails generation, corruption, and corporeality, properties which cannot belong to demons (1.1). […]
Demons’ lack of knowledge of natural particulars is merely one reason they cannot be the cause of wondrous sublunary events. Citing Augustine, Pomponazzi contended that all theologians hold that while demons can directly move bodies from one place to another they cannot alter them directly but must do so through natural bodies. Yet, Pomponazzi rejected the likelihood that demons affect change by applying active powers to passives, just like humans imperfectly do when they apply medicines. For Pomponazzi, this understanding of demonic action is untenable because it requires that demons use sensible material substances, which would be detectable. Presumably demons must carry these substances in pillboxes and bags, all of which is contrary to experience (1.2). Finally, he concluded that it is superfluous to suppose demonic influence “because we can save these kinds of experiences through natural causes” (1.3). Accordingly, the first half of On Incantations posits hypothetical natural causes of preternatural experiences in an attempt to show the inadequacy and superfluity of demonic explanation. Pomponazzi presented his conclusions as part of a process that leads closer to the truth, arguing that “sciences develop through steps” (scientiae enim fiunt per additamenta) (9.1). He likened this process to changes in legal codes, whereby better laws replace older inferior ones, admitting that his solutions should be accepted only while there are no preferable alternatives (Peroratio.1).”
subkind of HumanKnowedge
CauseOfWondrousEffectsThree causes of wondrous effects: “Employing doctrines key to natural magic, Pomponazzi put forth three potential ways that natural causes could explain wondrous effects”characterizes Preternatural Particular
ManifestCause; OccultPower;
IndirectCause
Employing doctrines key to natural magic, Pomponazzi put forth three potential ways that natural causes could explain wondrous effects:
directly through manifest causes, such as heat and cold; through occult qualities or powers; or indirectly [indirect causes] through vapors and spirits that had been altered by such powers (3.1–3; Copenhaver 2015: 272–84). In support of these explanations, citing Albertus Magnus, Marsilio Ficino, Pliny, and unnamed botanists, he maintained that herbs, stones, minerals, and animal extracts possess nearly countless occult powers and that if we knew them it would be possible to reduce those effects that the unlearned attribute to demons and angels to the actions of these occult powers. In support of the existence of these occult powers Pomponazzi described experiences with herbal medicines, magnets, electric rays (torpedines), and remoras—fish that allegedly could halt ships with the power of their mouths—experiences, all verified as true by respected authorities (3.2–3). […]
Applying these causes, Pomponazzi explained that many of those accused
of necromancy, like the medieval physicians and astrologers Pietro d’Abano and Cecco d’Ascoli, were merely very knowledgeable and capable of applying actives to passives (4.1). Moreover, it is possible that some humans possess extraordinary occult powers that allow them to affect cures through touch, like the kings of France, or to perform other marvelous feats such as charming snakes and opening doors without touching them (4.2). 
Pomponazzi argued that the powers of imagination can produce real effects. For example, he cited the widespread belief that women’s thoughts at the time of conception will produce a fetus that is similar to those thoughts.
Therefore, the power of fascination and imaginative powers transmitted
through vapors might explain unexpected cures and diseases just as
they are supposedly responsible for the spread of leprosy and plague”
subkind of CauseOfWondrousEffects
NaturalParticularNatural particulars are celestial and sublunary bodies.subkind of Particular
SublunaryParticularA particular sublunary body is an earthly object.subkind of NaturalParticular
ParticularHumanA particular humansubkind of SublunaryParticular

Sources

  • Martin, Craig, “Pietro Pomponazzi“, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2021 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).

First published: 05/11/2022

[4.18.7] William Ockham on Supposition and Sciences

William Ockham (1285-1349 AD), in the treatise Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard writes about the relationship between types of supposition and types of sciences:

  • Propositions (sentences) are made up of terms.
  • Terms in a proposition refer to other terms – the suppositum (or supposita); this relation is called supposition. The supposition of a term always occurs in a propositional context and can be entirely different from its signification (see [4.0.1]).
  • The relation between the term and the suppositum in the propositional context is called supposition (reference).
  • Ockham defines three kinds of supposition: personal, simple, and material.
  • For Ockham, science is a collection of true propositions. These propositions shouldn’t exclusively be about (1.3.10) universal knowledge.
  • “Traditionally, there were three kinds of sciences people distinguished: (a) the so called ‘real’ sciences: physics, metaphysics, and mathematics; (b) the so called ‘rational’ science: logic; and (c) ‘grammatical’ science: grammar.” (Spade)
  • Real science has personal supposition; rational science has simple supposition; grammatical science has material supposition.

The following OntoUML diagram presents Ockhams’s model of the relation between supposition and sciences:

William Ockham on Supposition and Sciences
ClassDescriptionRelations
Propositionproposition or sentence is made up of terms.component of Science
TermA mental, spoken, or written term.component of Proposition; supposits for Suppositum
SuppositumSuppositum is “whatever a term supposits for’ or refers to.”role of Term
Supposition“What sort of relation is supposition? Well, the first thing we can say about it is that supposition is a semantic relation. To a first (but pretty good) approximation, supposition in this first part of the theory is what nowadays we call ‘reference.’ It is the relation between the terms used in a proposition and the things those terms are used to talk about in that proposition. […]
supposition occurs only in a propositional context. And this is the first main difference between supposition and signification, which can occur outside a propositional context according to almost any author.
The second main difference is this: We do not always in practice use terms in propositions to talk about what those terms signify. We use them in a variety of other ways too. Hence supposition also differs from signification insofar as a term may signify one thing, but supposit on a given occasion for something entirely different.” (Spade – History of the Problem of Universals in the Middle Ages)
relates Proposition; Supposition; Suppositum
PersonalSupposition“Going with the ‘real’ sciences, there is what is called ‘personal’ supposition (which has nothing especially to do with persons — although it perhaps originated in theorizing about the persons of the Trinity). There terms stand for the things they signify. For example, in the sentence ‘Man is an animal’, the subject term ‘man’ is in personal supposition, and stands for individual human beings. They are the ones who are animals. The spoken or written word is not an
animal, and neither is the concept.” (Spade)
subkind of Supposition
SimpleSupposition“Going with the ‘rational’ science of logic, there is what is called “simple” supposition. There terms stand for concepts they do not signify. These concepts are the genera and species that logic talks about. For instance, in the sentence ‘Man is a species’ (in the sense in which it is true), the subject term ‘man’ stands for the concept “man,” which is a species — that is, a species-concept. It definitely does not
stand for any real universal man.” (Spade)
subkind of Supposition
MaterialSupposition“Going with ‘grammatical’ science, there is what is called ‘material’ supposition, in which terms stand for words they do not signify. For example, in ‘Man has three letters’, the subject term ‘man’ is in material supposition — at least in the sense in which the sentence is true. (But don’t make the mistake of thinking that Ockham’s “material supposition” is just what we do with quotation marks. It is more
complex than that.)” (Spade)
subkind of Supposition
ScienceFor Ockham, the object of a science is simply sentences with general terms in them. That’s how he accommodates Aristotle’s dictum that science deals with the universal.
This of course doesn’t mean that we can never, in our knowledge, get beyond the level of language to things. For Ockham, there are two senses of the term ‘know’ (= scire in Latin, from which comes scientia = science”):
(a) As we just said, the sense in which to know is to know a sentence, or a term in that sentence. In this sense, the object of a science is universal.
(b) We can also be said to know what that sentence is about, what the subject-term in it stands or supposits for. What we know in this sense is invariably the individual, metaphysically speaking, since there is nothing else for Ockham. This is not the object of science in the sense Aristotle is talking about. […]
Traditionally, there were three kinds of sciences people distinguished: (a) the so called ‘real’ sciences: physics, metaphysics and mathematics; (b) the so called ‘rational’ science: logic; and (c) ‘grammatical’ science: grammar. For each of these kinds of science, Ockham distinguishes a kind of ‘supposition.’” (Spade)
RealScience; “Traditionally, there were three kinds of sciences people distinguished: (a) the so called ‘real’ sciences: physics, metaphysics and mathematics” (Spade)subkind of Science; has PersonalSupposition
RationalScience; “Traditionally, there were three kinds of sciences people distinguished: (b) the so called ‘rational’ science: logic” (Spade)subkind of Science; has SimpleSupposition
GrammaticalScience“Traditionally, there were three kinds of sciences people distinguished: (c) ‘grammatical’ science: grammar. For each of these kinds of science, Ockham distinguishes a kind of ‘supposition.’” (Spade)subkind of Science; has MaterialSupposition

Sources

First published: 9/12/2021